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What drives governments with similar revenues to 
publicly provide very different amounts of goods for 
which private substitutes are available? Key examples are 
education and health care. This paper compares spending 
by Brazilian municipalities on pre-primary education—a 
good that is also provided privately—with spending on 
public infrastructure like parks and roads, which lacks 
private substitutes. Panel data from 1995–2008 reveal 
how the distribution of income affects public investment. 
Revenue is endogenous to investment outcomes, and 
the analysis addresses this problem by exploiting a 
1998, nationwide education finance reform and several 
revisions to the policy. The author constructs a variable 
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that captures exogenous variation in revenue generated 
by nonlinearities of the law to instrument for observed 
revenue. Municipalities with higher median income 
and more inequality are less likely to allocate revenue to 
education or to expand pre-primary enrollment. They are 
more likely to allocate revenue to public infrastructure. 
There is suggestive evidence that this occurs for two 
reasons, hypothesized in two separate literatures. In 
rich and unequal municipalities, fewer total people 
support public education spending (the collective choice 
channel), and also, any given poor person wanting public 
education has less influence over policymakers there (the 
political power channel).Politics and Preschool: The Political Economy of
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What drives governments with similar revenues to publicly provide very dierent amounts of
goods for which private substitutes are available? Education and health-care are prime examples;
in almost all countries, the public and the private sectors simultaneously provide versions of each.
Access to them may have profound impacts on growth and welfare. It is important to understand
why some governments provide more of the public version while others rely more on the private
version. This is especially so since the rich and the poor often consume dierent versions, with
the poor frequently consuming the public version. In this paper, I demonstrate that, in areas with
higher median income and greater income inequality, governments allocate less of an exogenous
revenue increase to goods with private substitutes (specically, pre-primary education) and more
to goods that have no private substitutes (such as roads and parks).
My central result can be explained by either of two existing theories. The rst, \collective
choice," hypothesizes that societies with higher income and more unequal income simply have
more people who consume a private sector version of publicly-provided goods. Because they
are consuming private versions, they vote for low spending on the public sector counterparts.
Under majority voting, the government thus provides less of goods with private substitutes.
This is in contrast to government provision of goods like infrastructure, which have no private
substitutes. Important models in this vein are due to Barzel (1973), Besley and Coate (1991),
Epple and Romano (1996), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), de la Croix and Doepke (2009), and
Gutirrez and Tanaka (2009). The second theory, \political power," argues that people have
control over public policy that is roughly proportionate to their share of income, as opposed to
their share of votes. That is, they can buy political inuence, even in a democracy. As others
grow richer relative to a given person, his ability to make government publicly supply the goods
he wants (which might include pre-primary education) declines. This person might have more
power under some sets of institutions that even the playing eld. Prominent studies in this vein
include Pande (2003), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), Bardhan and Mookerjee (2006), Banerjee
and Somanathan (2007), and Bartels (2009). The existing literature says little about the relative
importance of the two theories (channels). This is problematic because they do not necessarily
1imply the same socially-optimal policy interventions to address low equilibrium provision.
This paper's main contribution is an analysis of how an area's income distribution aects
how its government allocates revenue between goods with and without private substitutes. I
focus on pre-primary education in Brazil, for which private substitutes are readily available. The
strength of my analysis derives from a change in Brazil's school nance law which generates
exogenous variation that I carefully exploit. The paper's secondary contribution is an attempt
to apportion the estimated eects between the two channels described above. To do this, I make
use of the fact that some municipalities employ Participatory Budgeting (PB), an institution
designed to ensure that the poor have policy inuence equal to that of the rich. This exercise,
although imperfect as PB is not randomly assigned, suggests that both theories are operative.
I focus on pre-primary education in Brazil for four main reasons. First, this is a service for
which public and private versions are both widely available. Not only are private cr eches and
preschools abundant in Brazil, but also a family that cares for a young child at home is using a
private version. Second, Brazil has over 5,000 municipalities with full discretion over how much
revenue to allocate to pre-primary education. This is in contrast to health care and other levels of
education, where central governments often set spending, access, and quality requirements for all
areas.1 Third, Brazilian municipalities dier greatly in their income distributions, and only some
use PB. Otherwise, however, they have common institutional structures and constraints. Fourth,
pre-primary education is interesting in and of itself. Currie and Thomas (1995), Currie (2001),
Engle (2007), Berlinski et al. (2009), and Chetty et al. (2010) describe substantial benets of
investment in pre-primary, especially for poor children. Carneiro et al. (2003), Cunha et al.
(2006), and Heckman and Masterov (2007) suggest that the return to investment in a person's
human capital is higher the earlier it is made in his life. These researchers argue that, precisely
because their parents cannot privately provide adequate substitutes, poor children enjoy very high
returns to publicly-provided pre-primary. (This conclusion is not altogether uncontroversial.)
1Central governments often require universal provision of primary and secondary education, and impose quality
criteria. For example, in the U.S., school districts must comply with state certication and education standards
for teachers. Some states impose maximum teacher-student ratios, or school facility adequacy requirements
(like square feet per pupil). See Epple and Romano (1996) for a demonstration of how a minimum provision
requirement can cause enrollment that would be below the minimum level in equilibrium to jump far above it.
2An analysis like mine faces a signicant challenge to identication. Unobserved variables
that cause municipalities to have dierent revenue levels may also cause them to have dierent
preferences over goods. Fortunately, I am able to exploit a 1998 change in Brazil's education
nance law that generates exogenous variation in municipalities' revenue. Specically, I form a
simulated instrumental variable that encapsulates the credibly exogenous variation in revenue
generated by the law, but excludes variation due to the municipalities' own actions. I instrument
for actual (endogenous) revenue with the simulated instrument, thereby testing how dierent
municipalities dierentially spend an exogenous shock to revenue, all else equal.
Briey, the law, \Fund for Development of Elementary Education and Teachers" (FUN-
DEF) forced each of Brazil's 26 states to gather 15% of its municipalities' revenue in a state
fund. Each municipality then received a share of the fund equal to its share of total public
primary school students in the state. Because redistribution took place only within states (and
also because of various nonlinearities in the spending rules), similar municipalities experienced
very dierent changes in their nances. I form a simulated instrument using changes in the law's
parameters applied to municipalities' pre-law school enrollment and nances. Thus, only the law-
induced changes, not municipalities' responses, are incorporated in the simulated instrument.
The main results of the paper are as follows. An exogenous revenue increase attributable
to the law change causes municipalities to spend more on education and to increase public pre-
primary enrollment. However, richer and more unequal municipalities are signicantly less likely
to expand education spending and public pre-primary enrollment. The funds they do not spend
on education are signicantly more likely to end up in public infrastructure like roads and parks,
which do not have private sector substitutes.
Having shown this main result, I attempt to determine which theory accounts for the eects
of the distribution of income|the collective choice channel or the political power channel. To do
so, I compute separate estimates for municipalities with and without PB. Under PB, a share of
a municipality's revenue is automatically designated for each neighborhood, and neighborhood
citizens vote on how to spend their share. (Thus, it would be hard for the rich to capture
most of a municipality's revenue unless they somehow live in all neighborhoods, and dominate
3policymaking.) Also, under PB, the government is forced to publicize its budgets and spending in
a transparent manner. Case studies from Brazil suggest that PB increases political participation
of otherwise marginalized people and increases government accountability (Souza 2001).
To the extent that PB reduces the ability of the rich to buy disproportionate political
inuence, its presence suppresses the political power channel. Thus, the remaining eects are
likely due to the collective choice channel. My estimates suggest that the political power channel
accounts for about 30% of the eects, so that the collective choice channel is left with about
70%. In other words, both channels play an important role in determining how an area's income
distribution aects public investment. (The PB estimates should be interpreted with care since
PB is not randomly imposed. Even though municipalities with very similar income distributions
dier in whether they use PB, the ones that use it are presumably enthusiastic about transparency
and ensuring that the poor have a political voice. It is not obvious that PB would have equally
large eects in municipalities that do not wish to have it in place.)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts this paper in context by
reviewing closely related studies. Section 3 describes pre-primary education, the political system,
and education nance in Brazil, with special attention to the 1998 FUNDEF law and subsequent
revisions to it. Section 4 presents a formal model of the collective choice channel and sketches
the model that appears to be in the minds of most researchers interested in the political power
channel. Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy and data sources. Section 6 presents the main
empirical results. Section 7 shows a variety of robustness checks. Section 8 concludes.
2 Context
Two literatures could explain my results. Each describes a channel through which the distri-
bution of income aects public investment. It is an empirical question whether they operate
simultaneously. For now, one should consider them both to be possible explanations. Later, I
work to apportion their combined eects between the two channels.
The rst is a theoretical literature describing a \collective choice" channel. Authors use
a variety of approaches, but their models are embedded in a similar logic, and generate similar
4predictions. They hypothesize that if education quality is a normal good, the existence of private
education leads parents past a threshold income to exit the public sector. This is the income at
which the cost of private school tuition is just oset by the utility gain from consuming higher-
quality education. In societies with higher income and more unequal income, more people use
private schools, and thus vote for low or no spending on public education. Under majority voting,
this means less public education. Stiglitz (1974) showed that preferences are not singled-peaked
when private education is available. Several approaches address this and obtain existence of a
majority voting equilibrium: imposing a single crossing property in a median voter model (Epple
and Romano, 1996; Gutirrez and Tanaka, 2009), identifying the decisive voter (Barzel, 1973;
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998), and using a probabilistic voting model (de la Croix and Doepke
2009). In the next section, I present a model similar to de la Croix and Doepke (2009). However,
the reader should be aware that a variety of modeling assumptions deliver similar results.
The second literature describes a \political power" channel. It nds that the rich exercise
control over public policy that is roughly proportionate to their share of income (or a function
of it), as opposed to their share of votes. Chambers (1983) argues that the inability to inuence
policy is a dening feature of relative poverty. A number of papers show that inequality reduces
the political inuence of the poor. It is less clear what is the eect of higher median income.
However, the key implication of papers in this literature is that the distribution of income aects
policy, by aecting the distribution of political power and inuence.
Several prominent empirical studies describe the political power channel. Foster and Rosen-
zweig (2004) use panel data on villages in rural India to show how the share of the population
made up of landless poor aects public investment when the village leader is or is not elected.
They nd that in democratic villages, an increase in the share of landless increases road invest-
ment (which the landless want) and decreases irrigation investment (which they do not want)
more than in non-democratic villages.2 Bardhan and Mookerjee (2006), using a longitudinal
2Several studies nd similar results. Bates (1973, 1976, 1981) shows that some ethnic groups in post-
independence Africa increased their access to public funds by increasing their political salience. Varshney (1995),
Jarelot (2003), Pande (2003), Chandra (2004), and Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) nd similar results for low
caste groups in India. And Mansuri and Rao (2004) demonstrate, in a review of World Bank community-driven
development projects, that most projects are dominated by local elites and do not target the poor.
5sample of West Bengali villages, nd that villages with high land inequality and large incidence
of low-caste status and poverty receive less money from the central government. Within villages,
these factors do not aect who obtains government transfers (of credit, seeds, fertilizer, etc), but
do aect the allocation of public goods (whose allocation is less transparent), and the propensity
to select projects that generate employment for the poor. Bartels (2009) shows that U.S. voters
are not political equals. Inequality drives a wedge between what poor and rich citizens can spend
to inuence policy. In an empirical analysis of senator voting patterns in the 1980s and 1990s,
he nds that the upper third of the income distribution had 50% more inuence than the middle
third, and the bottom third had none.3 In a review of the literature, Keefer and Khemani (2005)
attribute such ndings to political market imperfections that reduce the incentives of politicians
to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty. 4 The authors note that \the broad services
most important to the poor|health and education|are the most vulnerable to these three dis-
tortions." To prevent domination of public policy by the rich (elite capture), they describe the
potential of decentralization, legislative reservations, and participatory budgeting.5
3 Background
3.1 Access to pre-primary education in Brazil
Policymakers in many parts of the world have extended public education to the pre-primary
level, covering children ages 0-6. A huge body of new research suggests that this investment
may benet children (especially disadvantaged ones), parents (especially mothers), and society.6
Patrinos (2007) estimates a preschool benet-cost ratio of 2.0 for Brazil, which is larger than
3According to Bartels, several trends are tightening the connection between income and inuence: increasing
political campaign expenditures and lobbying activities by corporations, and declining labor union membership.
4These include information gaps, social fragmentation, identity-based voting, and the inability to make cred-
ible promises. They may undermine the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), who predict that government
redistribution increases in inequality. Knack and Keefer (1997) nd no evidence to support Meltzer and Richard.
5Despite a lack of formal political power, other work suggests that the poor may have indirect power. Jha et
al. (2007) describe how informal slum leaders in India (pradhans) play a key role as intermediaries between the
urban poor and the government, allowing the poor access to services. Rock (1972), Auyero (2001), and Kingstone
and Power (2008) describe how neighborhood bosses aggregate and voice communal interests in Latin America.
6See Currie and Thomas (1995), Currie (2001), Jaramillo and Tietjen (2001), Campbell et al. (2002), Love
et al. (2002), Schweinhart et al. (2005), Aboud (2006), Armecin et al. (2006), Knudson et al. (2006), Engle et
al. (2007), Berlinski et al. (2008), Fitzpatrick (2008), Berlinski et al. (2009), Cascio (2009), and Chetty et al.
(2010).
6that of most public industrial and agricultural investments. Other research interprets benecial
ndings with caution.7
It is inherently dicult to explain investment in public pre-primary. Investing requires
revenue, which is less abundant in poor areas. However, poor areas may have higher net benets
from public pre-primary, making them more likely to invest. This may explain why economic
development is not a good predictor of pre-primary enrollment. Many European countries have
among the highest public preschool enrollment rates, but Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Thailand
have higher rates than either the U.S. or the U.K. (UNESCO 2006).8
Formal, school-based pre-primary education in Brazil has expanded rapidly but unevenly
in recent years. Figure 1 shows the national enrollment rate during 1995-2008.9 Enrollment
expanded from 8% to 18% among 0-3 year-olds (cr eche age) and from 48% to 80% among 4-6
year-olds (preschool age). The Figure 2 maps show 2008 state-level averages. In 2008, cr eche
enrollment ranged from 6% to 32%, and preschool enrollment ranged from 57% to 91%.10
Private pre-primary education in Brazil is of higher quality than public pre-primary. Ta-
ble 1 presents 2008 means of several school-level variables including pre-primary students per
teacher, the fraction of pre-primary teachers with at least some post-secondary education,11 and
the fraction of pre-primary schools with a designated school building,12 electricity, an indoor
bathroom, a library, and a computer. Private pre-primary schools outperform public on each
measure of quality, and the dierence is statistically signicant at the 0.01 level. Some of the dif-
ferences are large. Public institutions have 3 more children per teacher, and 15% fewer teachers
with post-secondary training, than private institutions. Indoor bathrooms are present in 80% of
7Anderson (2008) notes that some of the most inuential randomized evaluations carried out in the U.S.|
the Abecedarian Project, the Perry Preschool Program, and the Early Training Project|have serious statistical
inference problems and confounds. DHHS (2010) nds that advantages gained during a year of the Head Start
preschool program at age four dissipated by 2nd grade. Gormley et al. (2010) nd that pre-K quality is key.
8There is also substantial within-country variation. For example, in the U.S., while Florida, Georgia, and
Oklahoma provide free preschool to all four year-olds, 12 states do not fund any pre-primary (Pre-K Now 2010).
9In 2007, school became mandatory for six year olds, when primary education expanded from an eight to a
nine year sequence. This explains the sharp spike in the ages 4-6 graph in 2007, as parents of six-year-olds no
longer had the option to keep their children out of formal schooling.
10Averages are based on parental self reports in the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD). For a detailed
discussion of heterogenous trends in access to pre-primary in Brazil during 1996-2008, see Evans and Kosec (2010).
11This includes any post-high school education, whether or not a degree was obtained.
12Some schools report using a teacher's house, church, community center, local business, barn, or shed.
7public schools, but 96% of private ones. A library is present in 20% of public schools, but 62%
of private ones. This suggests why parents may pay for private pre-primary when public is free.
In the 2000 Census, about 32.8% of Brazilians were below the indigence line, dened as
the income necessary to consume the FAO minimum daily caloric intake.13 Based on the most
recent household expenditure survey conducted in Brazil,14 median per child expenditure on
private pre-primary education was 74% of the indigence line income. The 5th percentile of per
child expenditure was 15% of the indigence line income. This suggests that the indigent (and
probably many above this line) could not aord formal, private pre-primary education.
At higher incomes, parents are less likely to send their child to public pre-primary school,
less likely to keep their child out of school, and more likely to send their child to private pre-
primary school than at lower incomes. Figure 3 illustrates this with child-level data from the 2000
Brazilian Census. I examine the school enrollment status of 4-6 year-olds (preschool children),
and observe how this varies with per capita household income. From all enrollment and income
variables, I net out the eects of many potentially-relevant demographic characteristics.15 I then
plot the residuals and t a quadratic function. The function is positively-sloped when I consider
a dummy for enrollment in private pre-primary, or a dummy for enrollment in any pre-primary.
It is negatively-sloped when I consider a dummy for enrollment in public pre-primary. This will
be important later, as it supports my assumption that private pre-primary is a normal good.
3.2 Municipal governments and their nances
Brazil has over 5,000 municipal governments, with remarkable nancial and political autonomy.
They are led by an elected mayor and an elected city council. Legislative, budgetary, and
administrative authority are concentrated in the mayor's oce, and the city council is largely
responsible for approving the mayor's policies (Couto and Abrucio 1995; Wampler 2007).16
13This is 2,288 calories. See Ferreira et al. (2003) for computations of three poverty lines for Brazil using 1996
household survey data. The lowest is the indigence line. The authors also present a set of spatial income deators.
14This is the 1996-97 Living Standards Measurement Survey, carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (in Portuguese, Instituto Brasileiro de Geograa e Estat stica (IBGE)).
15I partial out the eects of child age and gender, household size, municipality xed eects, and several household
head variables including gender, migration status, years of education dummies, race dummies, and age dummies.
16For a thorough discussion of local politics in Brazil, see Ames (2001) and Kingstone and Power (2008). For
a treatment specic to the politics of education, see Plank (1996).
8The federal, state, and municipal governments share responsibility for publicly-provided
goods. Municipalities provide pre-primary and primary education, within-city transportation,
and infrastructure and urban development. The municipal revenue base is comprised of state and
federal government transfers, municipal tax collection, and miscellaneous revenue (e.g., earnings
from industrial, agricultural, and mineral activities). See Appendix B for more detail.
Education is one of the few publicly-provided goods with private substitutes that municipal
governments supply. They provide two levels: pre-primary (ages 0-6) and primary (ages 7-14),
with higher levels handled by state and federal governments. Primary education must be available
to all children at a federally-regulated minimum expenditure per student, and attendance is
compulsory. Pre-primary is optional for governments and for parents. Municipalities must spend
at least 25% of revenue on education. Municipal governments provide most public primary
education (83% of students in 2007), but state governments have some primary schools.
3.3 The FUNDEF and FUNDEB education nance reforms
Brazil has a history of cross-state and cross-municipality income inequality.17 This has trans-
lated into high variance in per capita municipal revenue. In 1998, the federal government passed
an education nance reform to partially equalize funding across municipalities: \Fund for the
Development of Elementary Education and Teachers" (FUNDEF).18 Federal policymakers wor-
ried that disparities in basic education investment threatened national progress.19 Rich states
opposed nation-wide redistribution, so a compromise of within-state redistribution was reached.
FUNDEF obligated each of Brazil's 26 states to gather 15% of each municipality's revenue,
and 15% of state government revenue, in a state fund.20 Each municipality then received a share
of the fund equal to its share of total public primary school students in the state. Enrollment
17In 2007, Brazil's GDP per capita was 13,400 (constant 2005 R$). (The average 2005 exchange rate was 0.4
USD/Reais). It ranged from 4,300 R$ in Piau  state to 37,700 R$ in the Federal District (IBGE 2007).
18In Portuguese, Fundo de Manuten c~ ao e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valoriza c~ ao do Mag-
ist erio.
19For a detailed account of Brazilian education policy during 1995-2002 from former Minister of Education
Paulo Renato Souza, who implemented FUNDEF, see Souza (2005).
20More accurately, each municipality had to pay into the fund 15% of its revenue from each of four main
intergovernmental transfers, which usually comprise the vast majority of municipal revenue.
9data come from the Ministry of Education's annual Census of Schools (Censo Escolar).21
The 15% payment to the state fund did count toward the 25% minimum expenditure on
education, but 10% more was required. All fund receipts had to go to education. If receipts did
not reach a federal minimum per primary school child, the federal government would `top o'
the fund, bringing it to this level.22 This ensured universal primary education of the required
quality before municipalities spent the remaining 2/5 of mandated education spending. In 2007,
the policy continued under \Fund for the Development and Maintenance of Basic Education"
(FUNDEB),23 which gradually increased the fraction of revenue paid to the fund and added other
levels of education to the redistribution algorithm. See Appendix B for more detail.
Municipalities benetting from the reform looked poor compared to others in their state
(even if they were rich in the Brazil-wide sense). In 1998, the average municipality got back
1.1 times what it paid in. At the 25th percentile of net receipts, municipalities got back 1/3 of
the amount paid in. At the 75th percentile, they got back 1.6 times the amount paid in. For
a municipality paying 15% of revenue, this implied a loss equivalent to 10% of revenue at the
25th percentile, and a gain equivalent to 9% of revenue at the 75th percentile. These are large
eects that likely led them to re-optimize spending. Table 2 summarizes the frequency of high,
moderate, and low net FUNDEF receipts per child in 1998 by high, moderate, and low average
income per capita. Many rich municipalities gained a lot, and many poor ones lost a lot.
A few factors limited FUNDEF crowd-out of local money. First, all fund receipts had to
go to education (by law). Beneciaries could potentially use fund receipts for other purposes by
reducing voluntary (above 25% of revenue) education spending. However, 37% of municipalities
had zero voluntary education spending in 1997 (the minimum was binding), and it was close
to binding for many more. If these municipalities cut taxes in response to new money, they
would have to reduce non-education spending, which might not be possible. Second, many
21The National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas
Educacionais An sio Teixeira) (INEP), an agency under the Ministry of Education, conducts the survey. State
and municipal departments of education collect the data, with public and private school cooperation. The transfer
of public funds depends on schools' cooperation with the survey, making the public school data especially reliable.
22In 1998, six states got federal top-o: Bahia, Cear a, Maranh~ ao, Par a, Pernambuco, and Piau . The per-child
minimum changed annually. It began to vary with child age (in 2000) and school type (rural/ urban) (in 2005).
23In Portuguese, Fundo de Manuten c~ ao e Desenvolvimento da Educa c~ ao B asica.
10municipalities depended heavily on transfers for revenue, reducing their power to choose the
level of revenue (in 1997, the average municipality got 85% of revenue from transfers). Finally,
politicians may not have wanted to cripple local tax collection infrastructure by lowering or
eliminating taxes, in case FUNDEF were short-lived or its eects changed over time. As a result,
revenue changed signicantly with the new law. Table 3 shows a frequency cross-tabulation of
municipalities in 1997 at each of ve levels of education spending and ve levels of dependence on
transfers. Panel (A) includes all municipalities, and Panel (B) includes predicted beneciaries. In
both panels, about 56% of municipalities spend only 25% of revenue on education, get 95-100%
of revenue from transfers, or both. Most would be highly constrained in their osetting behavior.
4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present a formal model of the collective choice channel. It closely follows de la
Croix and Doepke (2009), and has similar comparative statics: an increase in inequality or in
mean or median income leads to lower public school enrollment, less public education expenditure,
but higher-quality public education. My model diers in two respects. First, I exogenize public
revenue. Interventions like education nance equalization and aid do something similar. I assume
that policymakers allocate exogenously-given revenue between a good with private substitutes
(education) and one without (infrastructure). Second, for simplicity, I eliminate endogenous
fertility and assume each family has one voting parent and one child.
The distribution of income may also aect public investment through the political power
channel. In the formal model that follows, I suppose that citizens' policy preferences|which
vary with income|are aggregated in an unbiased way, via majority voting. I show why median
income and inequality aect policy when all citizens have equal inuence. I next sketch the model
that appears to be in the minds of most researchers interested in the political power channel.
4.1 Preferences
A municipality is populated by a continuum of households of measure 1. Households each include
one parent and one child, and are dierentiated by their income x. Parents derive utility from
11consumption c, their children's education h, and expenditure on public infrastructure f :
u = ln(c) +  ln(h) +  ln(f) (1)
 2 R+ is the weight attached to children's education, and  2 R+ is the weight attached to
infrastructure. Education is a dual-provision regime good, meaning it can be obtained in the
public or the private sector. Infrastructure|which may include roads, parks, or transportation
systems|can only be obtained from the public sector. Publicly-provided goods are nanced with
exogenous public sector revenue y. Education is funded by paying teachers a wage, normalized
to 1. Public education provides a uniform education of quality s, and is free to parents. Parents
can also opt out of the public education system and freely choose the private education quality e
they desire, but they must pay the teacher from their own income. Parents vote over the fraction
T of revenue y that will be used to fund public education, which determines the public schooling
quality s. Remaining public funds are invested in infrastructure. The budget constraint for a
parent is given by:
c = x   e (2)
where e = 0 if the parent chooses public education. Education is expressed as h=max fe;sg.
Substituting in the household budget constraint allows me to write household utility as:
u[x;T;e;s] = ln(x   e) +  ln maxfe;sg +  ln((1   T)y) (3)
4.2 Timing of events and private choices
Parental preferences over T depend on income x and the education choice e. The education







As education quality is a normal good, private spending is increasing in income x. Parents have
expectations about public education quality, E[s], which determine their education choice.
24This assumption is natural given switching costs between public and private school. As shown below, e does
not depend on the outcome of the voting process. Thus, the timing of its choice does not aect the results.







such that households strictly prefer private education if and only if x>~ x.
Proof. See Appendix C.
An implication of this lemma is that, if parents with income x choose public schooling, all those
with income x0 < x strictly prefer public schooling. Also, if parents with income x choose private
schooling, all those with income x0 > x strictly prefer private schooling.
I assume a uniform distribution of income over the interval [1+r ;1+r+].25 Average
(and median) income equals that of teachers when r = 0. The parameter  2 (0;1+r) captures
the degree of income inequality, and r captures how rich the average citizen is. The associated
density function is given by g(x) = 0 for x < 1+r   and for x > 1+r +, and g(x) = 1=(2)




> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ~ x < 1 + r   
~ x (1+r )
2 if 1 + r     ~ x  1 + r + 
1 if ~ x > 1 + r + 
(6)
4.3 Preference aggregation and equilibrium




sg[x]dx = y , f + 	s = y (7)
where total public infrastructure investment is f = (1 T)y and total public education investment
is 	s = yT. T is chosen via probabilistic voting, which I describe in detail in Appendix C. Since
s and T are linked through the budget constraint, the policy choice is one-dimensional.
The intuition of probabilistic voting is as follows. Under probabilistic voting, one assumes
that there are two political parties, p and q. The median voter model assumes that the probability
25de la Croix and Doepke (2009) also assume a uniform distribution, for simplicity. Other distributions yield
similar results. Under probabilistic voting, there is no signicance to the relative positions of median and mean.
13that a voter casts a ballot for party q jumps discretely from 0 to 1 once the voter's utility gain
from party q winning instead of p becomes positive.26 Probabilistic voting assumes that voters
may be more ideologically drawn to one party than the other, independently of the party's
proposed policy. The probability of voting for party q increases gradually as party q's platform
becomes more attractive, and each party's vote share thus varies continuously with the proposed
policy platform. This leads to smooth aggregation of all voters' preferences instead of sole
dependence on the preferences of the median voter. Both parties maximize their vote share
by maximizing a weighted social welfare function, where weights are decreasing in a voter's
ideological bias. The parties act symmetrically in equilibrium, both trying to maximize their
vote share, so T = T p = T q and s = sp = sq. For simplicity, I assume all voters have the same
level of ideological bias. In this case, the objective function maximized by the policymaker under


















Equation (9) shows that s is decreasing in the participation rate in public schools, 	. When more
children participate in public schools, spending per child is reduced. From equation (10), a rise in
participation is followed by a less than proportional rise in the fraction of public spending going
to education. Appendix C presents a proof of the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium.
4.4 Comparative statics
Proposition 1 (Revenue and public education). An exogenous revenue increase leads to







26This voting mechanism delivers an equilibrium despite the existence of non-single-peaked preferences over T.
14A revenue increase leads to more public spending on education, which entices more parents to
use public school. Quality will depend on whether new enrollment osets new expenditure.
Proposition 2 (Inequality and public education).27 If 	  0:5, an increase in
inequality leads to lower enrollment in public school, a higher quality of public school, and a










Proposition 3 (Income and public education). An increase in mean or median income
leads to lower enrollment in public school, a higher quality of public school, and a smaller fraction










Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. See Appendix C.
Intuitively, an increase in income or inequality raises the income of the marginal person, who was
previously indierent. The person now strictly prefers private school, leading to lower enrollment
in public. Enrollment drops more quickly than spending, so public school quality increases.
This model permits the distribution of income to aect public investment only through its
eect on the collective choice. In contrast, a sizeable literature suggests that the distribution of
income aects policy through its eect on citizens' relative power and inuence over policymakers.
Theoretical models describing political power mechanisms model political participation increasing
in income (Benabou 2000), political power depending on how active are the media (Besley and
Burgess 2002), and special-interest groups being able to make political contributions in order to
inuence policy (Grossman and Helpman 1994). Empirical papers on the political power channel
(reviewed in Section 2) are naturally less explicit about the particular function translating income
into political power. However, most authors seem to have in mind a model in which inuence is
27A focus on regions of the parameter space where 	  0:5 is common to most of the public nance literature
on the public provision of education in a dual-provision regime. Since participation in public schools far exceeds
50% in nearly all countries, the literature notes that this is the empirically relevant case.
15an increasing function of income. The rich can oer larger campaign contributions or bribes, and
may have lower costs of political activity due to personal connections with politicians. Several
papers show that inequality reduces the inuence of the poor. The eect of higher median income
in less clear.28 However, a key implication of papers in this literature is that the distribution of
income aects policy, by aecting the distribution of political power.
It seems reasonable that both channels matter, but their eects have not been separated
by the existing literature. In the next section, I show how median income and inequality aect
investment. I then attempt to apportion the estimated eects between the two channels.
5 Empirical Strategy
Theory suggests that higher median income and higher inequality lead to: (i) lower enrollment in
public school, (ii) higher public education quality, (iii) lower public education expenditure, and
(iv) higher public expenditure on goods without private substitutes, like infrastructure. Here, I
present an empirical model that captures these theoretical predictions. I test the model using
panel data on Brazil's over 5,000 municipalities during 1995-2008. Shortly, I take up the issues of
identication and measurement of income, inequality, enrollment, and school quality. For now,
assume that these variables are accurately measured and all variation in revenue is exogenous.
The availability of revenue aects investment. Ideally, one would randomly assign per capita
revenue, rit to municipalities with varying distributions of income, and see how the distribution
of income moderates how revenue is spent. This experiment implies the following empirical
specications:
pit = 1;i + 1;t + 1rit + 1(rit  gi) + 1(rit  dit) + 1dit + u1;it (11)
qit = 2;i + 2;t + 2rit + 2(rit  gi) + 2(rit  dt) + 2dit + u2;it (12)
eit = 3;i + 3;t + 3rit + 3(rit  gi) + 3(rit  dit) + 3dit + u3;it (13)
28A variance-preserving, mean-increasing shift in the distribution of income would have dierent eects, for
example, if the function converting income into inuence is linear vs. exponential.
16fit = 4;i + 4;t + 4rit + 4(rit  gi) + 4(rit  dit) + 4dit + u4;it (14)
where i index municipalities and t index years. Capturing the distribution of income, dit is (me-
dian or mean) per capita income and git measures the inequality of its distribution. I care about
enrollment in and quality of public pre-primary education, described by pit and qit, respectively.
I also care about how much revenue policymakers spend on public education, eit vs. on goods
only obtainable from the public sector (like roads and parks), fit. I consider both total per capita
spending and the fraction of revenue spent on each category.
National inequality in Brazil has changed little in the last 50 years.29 To avoid overstating
the signicance of subtle variation in inequality, and given a lack of inequality data for intercensal
years, I assume that within-municipality income inequality is roughly constant over the sample
period. Thus, it only enters the model in interaction.
The predictions that more unequal and higher-income municipalities are less likely to use
revenue to expand public pre-primary enrollment, and more likely to increase its quality, implies:
1;1 < 0; 2;2 > 0
The predictions that more unequal and higher-income municipalities spend relatively less
revenue on education, and more on goods without private substitutes (infrastructure), implies:
3;3 < 0; 4;4 > 0
5.1 Identication
There are two identication problems likely to aect the analysis of pre-primary education policy.
The rst is the potential for omitted variable bias. The second is the potential for observed per
capita revenue to be endogenous due to reverse causality.
Observed per capita revenue is the result of factors aecting both the supply of funds and
the population's demand for funds. I want to rely solely on variation in revenue that comes
from the supply side. Factors which aect demand for revenue may have a direct eect on pre-
29In 1960, the rst year the Brazilian Census collected household income data, the national Gini coecient was
0.59. It was also 0.59 as of the 2000 Census (Skidmore 2004).
17primary education policy choices. If they do, then na ve estimates of the eects of revenue and
its interactions with income and inequality would be biased by omitted variables.
There are several possible sources of omitted variable bias (I detail three below). First,
having an older population may mean more working adults as a fraction of the population, and
thus more tax revenue. However, if having fewer children reduces the need for pre-primary
education, ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates of the eects of revenue and its interactions
with income and inequality would be biased. The magnitude of the bias would shrink as measures
of population-by-age are added to equations (11), (12), (13), and (14), but it would be impossible
to know when all bias had been eliminated. This would downward-bias estimates of the eects of
revenue on pre-primary enrollment and quality, and education investment. Second, mayors with
high discount rates or who are corrupt may generate higher revenue to maximize private gains.30
However, short-sightedness may also lower investment in education, which has long-term payos.
This, too, would downward-bias the estimates. Finally, municipalities with higher revenue may
pay higher wages to public ocials. Ferraz and Finan (2009b) show that, in Brazil, this leads
to more political competition, and to the election of better-educated, more experienced, more
productive candidates. If these qualities increase public pre-primary investment, this would
upward-bias estimates of the eects of revenue on such investment.
Municipal revenue per capita can also be a response to education policy. This is a classic
problem of reverse causality. Municipalities that invest heavily in pre-primary may need to
level more taxes to pay for it. The best response to these identication problems is a set of valid
instruments. These instruments should aect revenue and its interactions with per capita income
and inequality, but should be uncorrelated with factors aecting the demand for revenue.
5.2 Instruments for per capita revenue
To address these threats to identication, I exploit the federal FUNDEF/B education nance
reforms described in Section 3, which generated exogenous variation in municipalities' revenue.
30de Janvry et al. (2009) suggest such a possibility. They nd that second term mayors in Brazilian munic-
ipalities, who are not eligible for reelection, have less transparent policies and are less likely to reduce school
drop-out rates using federal funds designated for this purpose. Ferraz and Finan (2009a) show that rst term
mayors misappropriate 27% fewer resources than second term mayors, which they also link to electoral incentives.
18These laws redistributed revenue within states according to an algorithm handed down by the
federal government, and thus exogenous to any one municipality's investment decisions. The
rules changed slightly each year, but always identify two things: how much each municipality
has to pay into its state's education fund (always a set fraction of its revenue), and how much of
the fund is given to each municipality (equal to its share of total public school students in the
state, with students at dierent grade levels weighted dierently each year). Given enrollment
and initial revenue data for all municipalities, the algorithm delivers a \new" revenue to each
municipality, which is lower for net losers and higher for net winners from the reform.
Of course, the reforms almost certainly induced endogenous revenue and enrollment re-
sponses (Hoxby 2001; Gordon 2004). A good instrument should encapsulate the credibly exoge-
nous variation in revenue generated by the law, but exclude variation due to municipalities' own
actions. To do this, I simulate the revenue each municipality would have each year if the current
year algorithm were applied to 1997 (pre-reform) enrollment and revenue data. I then instru-
ment for actual (endogenous) revenue with the simulated instrument, which allows me to test
how dierent municipalities dierentially spend an exogenous shock to revenue, all else equal.
I instrument for the interaction of per capita revenue with covariates using the interaction of
simulated per capita revenue with those covariates.31 See Appendix D for further details.
The rst stage equations state that per capita revenue and its interactions with per capita
income and inequality are a function of simulated per capita revenue, sit and its interactions
with per capita income and inequality:
rit = 1;i + 1;t + sit + 1(sit  gi) + 1(sit  dit) + !1dit + 1;it (15)
rit  gi = 2;i + 2;t + sit + 2(sit  gi) + 2(sit  dit) + !2dit + 2;it (16)
rit  dit = 3;i + 3;t + sit + 3(sit  gi) + 3(sit  dit) + !3dit + 3;it (17)
31In a similar vein, Mart nez-Fritscher et al. (2010) use commodity price shocks in Brazil during 1889-1930
as an instrument for state capacity to spend on publicly-provided goods. They nd that education expenditures
increased during this period in response to positive shocks to the prices of commodities produced heavily in a
given state.
19I must avoid introducing endogenous variation into the instruments. This might occur if munic-
ipalities are on dierent time trends according to their values of the pre-period variables used
to compute the instruments. Municipalities might also be on dierent time trends according to
initial public pre-primary enrollment levels. I address these concerns by including the interaction
of a linear time trend, t with a vector of the 1997 values of per capita revenue, per capita transfer
revenue, the fraction of public primary school students in state or federal schools, the fraction
of 0-6 year-olds enrolled in public pre-primary, and public pre-primary enrollment squared. This
allows for heterogeneous secular trends in municipalities with dierent pre-reform characteristics.
In the results section, I demonstrate that these instruments satisfy the inclusion restriction:
they are correlated with observed per capita revenue and with its interactions with per capita
income and inequality. The exclusion restriction should hold since the instruments depend only
on pre-reform municipality characteristics (captured by xed eects) and federal government
rules, which are exogenous to any particular municipality's investment during the sample period.
5.3 Measuring income, inequality, and pre-primary investment
I measure income two ways, to ensure robustness: median and average per capita municipal
income. I compute median per capita household income using 2000 Census data. Average
income data are available annually. I measure inequality with the municipal Gini coecient,
computed from 2000 Census data. Results instead using mean over median income, and the level
of income polarization,32 are similar and available upon request. Table 4 presents a correlation
matrix of these variables. The correlation between the Gini coecient and per capita income
(whether median or average), is always below 0.04 in absolute value. Median and average income
have a correlation of 0.72.
I have panel data on several aspects of public pre-primary education quality:33 pre-primary
students per teacher, the fraction of pre-primary teachers with at least some post-secondary ed-
ucation, and the fraction of pre-primary schools with a designated school building, electricity, an
32I measure income polarization using individual-level data on all voting-age (16+) persons in the 2000 Brazilian
Census, and following the method described in Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004). I set the parameter , capturing
the importance of local clustering of income, to an intermediate value of 0.5.
33All measures of pre-primary education quality are not available for 1995, but are available for 1996-2008.
20indoor bathroom, a library, and a computer. Given high correlation among these variables, I use
principal components analysis (PCA) to combine the rst two measures into an index of teacher
quality, and the last ve into an index of infrastructure quality. I reduce the dimensionality of
the data by using the rst principal component. In the teacher quality PCA, the rst principal
component explains 52% of the variation in the quality variables, with an eigenvalue of 1.04. In
the infrastructure quality PCA, it explains 60% of the variation, with an eigenvalue of 3.01.
The pre-primary enrollment rate is the number of public pre-primary school students
(cr eche or preschool) as a fraction of the population of children aged 0-6. Starting in 2007,
the denominator is the population of children aged 0-5 (the new primary school age range).
5.4 Demographic, economic, and political trends
An additional concern is the potential correlation of income and inequality with demographic,
economic, or political trends that aect public investment. I thus account for total population,
age 0-6 population, and age 7-15 population (all in 100,000s) in the main specication. As a
matter of robustness, I show specications including three time-varying political factors: the
mayor's vote share in the previous election, the number of political parties competing for mayor,
and an HHI of between-party competition for mayor. I also show specications including time-
varying exogenous shocks to the world prices of three important agricultural products in Brazil:
coee, cocoa, and bananas. I multiply the current year world price of each by how many hectares
there were in the municipality in 1994.34 The inclusion of all three sets of variables has virtually
no eect on the sign, magnitude, or signicance of , , or  in any of equations 11 through 14.
5.5 Data
I used several data sources, matched geographically at the municipality level. An observation is
a municipality-year. Data are generally available for 1995-2008, and are summarized in Table 5.
School-level data on students, teachers, infrastructure, and amenities are available from
INEP's Census of Schools. The data are of very high quality and detail. From these data,
I computed school enrollment by level (pre-primary, primary, secondary) and administrative
34This Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) takes a municipality to be a market and political parties to be rms.
21dependence (municipal, state, federal, or private), and computed the quality measures described
earlier. Annual data on income per capita, population, and population-by-age are available from
IBGE.35 I use population-by-age data to compute school enrollment rates. IBGE provided 2000
Census data (an 11.7% sample covering 20.3 million people). I have data on individual income,
demographics, and school attendance (including level and administrative dependence).
The National Treasury (Tesouro Nacional) provided data on revenue and expenditure by
type. A valid concern is that a nominal amount of currency may have more purchasing power
in some areas|possibly in poorer or more rural parts of Brazil|than in others. To address this
concern, I convert all measures of revenue, expenditure, and income to constant, 2005 S~ ao Paulo
currency using a set of spatial income deators for Brazil computed by Ferreira et al. (2003).
The Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral) provided data on the results of
municipal elections during 1996-2008. From these, I computed the three time-varying political
variables described earlier, and coded a dummy for whether the mayor represented a socialist
party. Brian Wampler, Leonardo Avritzer, and Yves Zamboni provided data on which munici-
palities with populations over 50,000 had participatory budgeting (PB) during 1992-2008. I used
these to construct a dummy for a municipality having PB sometime during the sample period.
Finally, the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)36 provided data on hectares of
coee, cocoa, and bananas in each municipality in 1994. Annual price data for these commodities
are available from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics.
6 Results
6.1 First stage results
Table 6 presents estimates of the rst-stage regressions. Actual municipal revenue is robustly
positively correlated with simulated revenue. Column (1) indicates that a 1 Reais increase in
simulated revenue is associated with 0.42 Reais more revenue.37 The F-statistic on the excluded
35I have population by age data for 1991, 1996, 2000, 2007. I compute annual estimates by linear interpolation.
36In Portuguese, Instituto de Pesquisa Econ^ omica Aplicada.
37Several factors can explain why this coecient is not equal to 1.0. First, municipalities can reduce collections
of tax revenue in response to an inux of money from FUNDEF/B. Second, the panel is rather long; changes in
the political and economic landscape of a municipality over time may drive the coecient up or down.
22instrument is 347. I next interact simulated revenue with income and inequality, to explicitly
allow municipalities to convert revenue shocks from the law into revenue dierently, according to
their levels of income and inequality. An increase in simulated revenue increases revenue more
in higher-income municipalities (signicant at the 0.01 level), and may increase it less in more
unequal municipalities (signicant at the 0.10 level in some specications). The F-statistic on
the joint signicance of the excluded instruments is over 150 in every rst stage specication
but one, where it is 93. There do not appear to be weak instrument problems. In these and all
specications, I cluster standard errors at the municipality level since revenue varies at this level.
6.2 Eects of FUNDEF/B on public pre-primary investment
Table 7 presents OLS and IV estimates of the eects of revenue on investment in public pre-
primary education, with and without population and income controls. The IV estimates, which
account for the endogeneity of revenue, support the predictions. A reform-induced revenue
increase leads to higher enrollment in pre-primary education, higher education expenditure per
capita (i.e. per population), and a larger share of revenue being spent on education. Whether
measured by the teacher quality index or the infrastructure quality index, the quality of public
pre-primary education decreases with a revenue increase, which is of special interest given that
theory could not sign this coecient.
In all IV specications, revenue is signicant at the 0.01 level, and the income and popula-
tion controls have little eect on its point estimate. Column (2) shows that a standard deviation
increase in per capita revenue (about 530 R$, or 210 USD, in 2005 currency) is associated with a
4.3 percentage point increase in public pre-primary enrollment (a variable whose mean is 0.23).
This is an 18% increase over mean enrollment. The negative eects on quality are also large;
columns (4) and (6) indicate that a standard deviation revenue increase is associated with a
1.9 standard deviation decrease in the teacher quality index, and a 0.36 standard deviation de-
crease in the infrastructure quality index. Additional revenue leads to an inux of new students,
but municipalities accommodate higher enrollment by hiring less-educated teachers or increasing
class sizes, and by using lower-quality infrastructure. Column (8) shows that an extra 1 R$ of
23revenue per capita results in 0.37 R$ more per capita education spending|close to education
spending's average 30% share of total expenditure. Column (10) shows that education spending
as a fraction of revenue is increasing in revenue; a standard deviation revenue increase leads to
2.7 percentage points more revenue going to education.
OLS estimates are suciently dierent from IV estimates to suggest bias. Both suggest that
higher revenue is associated with higher pre-primary enrollment and higher education spending,
but the OLS estimates are smaller in magnitude than the IV estimates. This is consistent with
the previously-described channels of downward bias. If revenue is higher precisely where there
are fewer child care needs or a mayor with a high discount rate, then OLS would mute the eects
of revenue on pre-primary enrollment and education spending due to its correlation with these
unobservables. Under OLS, revenue has a near-zero eect on both teacher and infrastructure
quality (columns 4 and 6), which is statistically insignicant in the case of infrastructure quality.
6.3 The roles of income and inequality
According to the predictions, median income and inequality moderate the eects of a reform-
induced revenue increase. One expects higher median income and higher inequality to result
in: (i) a smaller increase in public pre-primary enrollment, (ii) a smaller decrease in public
pre-primary quality, (iii) a smaller increase in public education expenditure, and (iv) a larger
increase in public expenditure on goods without private sector substitutes, like infrastructure.
In this section, I test these predictions and nd empirical support for each.
Table 8 shows the results for public pre-primary enrollment. Per capita revenue has a
positive eect on enrollment, but this eect is statistically signicantly smaller (at the 0.01
level) in richer and more unequal municipalities. By column (5), if two otherwise identical
municipalities have Gini coecients at the 25th and the 75th percentiles (0.37 and 0.41), a revenue
increase that would lead a median inequality municipality to enroll 100 new pre-primary students
would lead the more unequal municipality to enroll only 87, and the more equal municipality
to enroll 113. Also by column (5), if two otherwise identical municipalities have median per
capita incomes at the 25th and 75th percentiles (1150 and 3020 in constant 2005 R$/year), a
24revenue increase that would lead a median income municipality to enroll 100 new pre-primary
students would lead the richer municipality to enroll only 28, and the poorer municipality to
enroll 163. Figure 4 illustrates how this varies across municipalities at each decile of income and
of inequality. The income gradient is steeper than the inequality gradient, but both profoundly
aect a municipality's propensity to expand public pre-primary enrollment following a revenue
shock. The results are similar in column (4), where I use mean instead of median income.
Table 9 presents results for four measures of public pre-primary quality: pre-primary stu-
dents per teacher, the fraction of pre-primary teachers with post-secondary education, the teacher
quality index, and the infrastructure quality index. In keeping with predictions, I nd that both
richer and more unequal municipalities are more likely to use an exogenous revenue increase to
improve public pre-primary quality (2;2 > 0). This nding is statistically signicant at the
0.01 level in most specications, although the inequality interaction term is insignicant in the
students per teacher and teacher quality index regressions. Again comparing otherwise identi-
cal municipalities with Gini coecients at the 25th and 75th percentiles, a standard deviation
revenue increase leads the more unequal municipality to have 1.3 - 1.5 percentage points more
teachers with post-secondary education (6 - 7% of the mean rate) and 0.02 - 0.03 standard de-
viations higher infrastructure quality. Comparing otherwise identical municipalities at the 25th
and 75th percentiles of per capita income, a standard deviation revenue increase leads the richer
municipality to have 6.6 - 6.7 fewer students per teacher (35% of mean class size), 8 percentage
points more post-secondary-educated teachers (35% of the mean rate), a teacher quality index
that is 1.1 standard deviations higher, and an infrastructure quality index that is 0.14 - 0.16
standard deviations higher.
Table 10 examines expenditure by sector. I consider education and infrastructure spending,
both in per capita terms and as a share of total revenue. Inequality interacted with revenue has
the expected negative eect on education spending as a share of revenue, but is insignicant in all
other specications. Revenue interacted with income is always signicant at the 0.01 level, and
has the predicted sign; negative for education spending (3 < 0), and positive for infrastructure
spending (4 > 0). By columns (4) and (8), if two otherwise identical municipalities have median
25per capita incomes at the 25th and the 75th percentiles, a revenue increase that would lead a
median income municipality to spend 1 R$ of it on education would lead the richer municipality to
spend only 0.67 R$, and the poorer municipality to spend 1.29 R$. On the other hand, a revenue
increase that would lead a median income municipality to spend 1 R$ of it on infrastructure
would lead the richer municipality to spend 1.10 R$, and the poorer municipality to spend only
0.91 R$. Figure 5 illustrates how this varies across municipalities at each decile of income. Once
again, the income gradient is steeper than the inequality gradient, but both strongly inuence a
municipality's public spending patterns. The results are similar in columns (3) and (7), where I
use mean instead of median income.38
As a partial test of the exogeneity of the instruments, I estimate overidentied models
with four excluded instruments: simulated revenue, and its interactions with median income,
average income, and the Gini. The estimates of  and  are almost identical. The Hansen J
test statistics of each model, distributed 2
1, indicate that the instruments are appropriately
uncorrelated with the disturbance process. I consistently fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments aect investment only through their eect on revenue and its interactions with
income and inequality.39
6.4 Contrasting the collective choice and political power channels
These results can be explained by either of two existing theories, or channels: a collective choice
channel, and a political power channel. If both matter, then the estimates reect their combined
impact. In this section, I attempt to apportion the eects between the two channels by focusing
on municipalities where the political power channel is suppressed. In these municipalities, the
eects are likely due to the collective choice channel.
Ideally, I would randomly assign some municipalities to determine public investment with-
out preferring any citizen over another. This would eectively turn o the political power channel.
If the eects of income and inequality were the same in treated and untreated municipalities,
38Results shown in Appendix Table A.4 indicate that the ndings are substantially similar when I use logged
values of revenue and the outcome variables. Also, the addition of political and agricultural controls has virtually
no eect on the coecients interpreted in this analysis, or their standard errors.
39A table of these results is available upon request.
26this would suggest that the collective choice channel accounts for the results. If income and
inequality mattered in untreated but not in treated municipalities, this would suggest that the
political power channel accounts for the results. If they had signicant but distinct eects in
treated versus untreated municipalities, this would suggest a role for each channel.
Such a policy experiment is not feasible. However, following Brazil's return to democracy in
1985, many municipalities put in place an institution that did something similar: Participatory
Budgeting (PB). Under PB, citizens vote on how to use a share of municipal revenue designated
for their neighborhood, and elect neighborhood representatives to make municipality-wide spend-
ing decisions. Citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources. Poli-
cymakers are required to publicize budgets and expenditures to promote transparency (Bould-
ing and Wampler 2010). Case studies from Brazil suggest that PB increases participation of
marginalized groups, leads to more pro-poor expenditures, and increases government account-
ability (Souza 2001). By dividing the budget into shares, PB mechanically ensures a quite equal
distribution of power (unless the rich somehow live in all neighbors, and dominate policymaking).
According to Melo (2009), \One of the most salient aspects of PB is that most experiences
originated in municipalities where an elected mayor lacked the support of the local legislative
chamber (municipal council)." The legislature can veto any budget, but nds it politically di-
cult to do so when the budget comes from the people, through PB. When divided government
paralyzes policymaking, mayors implement PB to get the policy process moving again. More
often then not, PB has remained in place following its implementation.
I use data on which municipalities had PB at some point during the sample period. The
data are available for all municipalities with a population over 50,000|about 14% of the sample.
I estimate the baseline model for three sets of municipalities: large municipalities (population
over 50,000), large municipalities with PB, and large municipalities without PB.
Table 11 shows how the eects of income and inequality on spending vary by the presence
of PB. I use three dependent variables: the public pre-primary enrollment rate, education spend-
ing per capita, and the teacher quality index. I measure income with the per capita median.
Inequality does not seem to moderate the eect of revenue on public pre-primary quantity or
27quality in larger municipalities. A quick correlation of the Gini coecient and median income
reveals that while it is 0.01 in the full sample, it is 0.22 among these larger municipalities. This
may be driven by higher variance in employment opportunities in cities (which are themselves
generally richer), while rural areas are more uniformly poor. This high correlation and the small
sample size may complicate estimation of the partial eects of income and inequality. Of course,
in more urban areas, inequality may just have little impact on public investment.
Per capita median income is a robustly signicant factor (at the 1% level) explaining
the use of an exogenous revenue increase in larger municipalities. Whether or not PB is in
place, I nd that richer municipalities are less likely to use an exogenous revenue increase to
boost education spending or pre-primary enrollment, and more likely to improve public pre-
primary quality. However, the estimates are signicantly smaller in magnitude (closer to 0) for
the sub-sample of PB municipalities (for which the political channel is suppressed). This has
two major implications. First, the collective choice channel matters, and its independent eect
supports the predictions of the formal model. That is, even when PB is in place and the political
power channel is suppressed, the distribution of income still moderates how revenue is spent, in
accordance with the collective choice model presented in Section 4. Second, the political power
channel also matters. Specically, turning on the political power channel (going from PB to
no PB) intensies the negative eect of higher median income on public pre-primary enrollment
and education investment, and intensives its positive eect on public pre-primary quality. Higher
median income seems to be associated with lower political power among those consuming public
pre-primary (disproportionately, the poor). Moving to PB and thus eliminating the connection
between income and policy inuence is associated with a smaller negative eect of income on
pre-primary enrollment, and a smaller positive eect of income on public pre-primary quality.
Comparing the results for the full sample vs. PB sub-sample oers insight into the eects
of each channel. For pre-primary enrollment, moving from full sample to PB sub-sample leads
the negative coecient on revenue interacted with income to drop in magnitude by about 30%
(though it is still negative). The dierence is statistically signicant at the 0.16 level if I cluster
standard errors (at the municipality level) and at the 0.02 level if I do not cluster. For the teacher
28quality index, moving from full sample to PB sub-sample leads this positive coecient to drop by
about 17%. However, the dierence is statistically insignicant at conventional levels. For public
education spending, moving from full sample to PB sub-sample leads the negative coecient on
revenue interacted with median income to drop in magnitude by about 58% (though it is still
negative), and the negative coecient on revenue interacted with inequality (signicant only for
this dependent variable) to drop in magnitude by about 45% (though it is still negative). The
dierence is statistically signicant at the 0.01 level, whether or not I cluster.
Given an exogenous revenue increase, this suggests that richer municipalities are less likely
to expand public pre-primary enrollment for two reasons: because they have a collective choice of
less public pre-primary (about 70% of the eect) and because citizens with the highest demand
for public pre-primary (disproportionately, the poor) have less political power in such settings
(about 30% of the eect). In other words, both the collective choice and political power channels
are operative. In the case of education spending, the collective choice channels accounts for
about 42% of the eect of income and 55% of the eect of inequality (with 62% and 45%,
respectively, due to the political power channel). Finally, in the case of pre-primary quality, the
collective choice channel seems to account for most of the eect. The point estimates suggest
that it accounts for 83%, and it may account for more as the coecients, 2, are not statistically
signicantly dierent in the PB and non-PB sub-samples.
The PB estimates should be interpreted with care because PB is not randomly imposed on
municipalities. While municipalities with similar income distributions dier in whether they use
PB, those that use it are presumably enthusiastic about transparency and ensuring the poor a
political voice. It is not obvious that PB would have equally large eects in municipalities that
do not want it. Overall, I take these estimates as suggestive evidence that both channels matter.
7 Robustness
7.1 An alternate measure of equal access to political power
It is of course possible that participatory budgeting does not fully suppress the political power
channel. Within neighborhoods, for example, elites might exert disproportionate power over
29the use of the assigned share of revenue. Additionally, PB may mean slightly dierent things
in dierent municipalities. Finally, the large municipalities for which I have PB data could
be unique, casting doubt on the validity of the results in less-urban contexts. I address these
concerns in this section by considering a second measure of equal access to political power for
which I have data for all municipalities.
If the poor still have less political power than the rich under PB, my analysis would under-
estimate the importance of the political power channel. Ideally, I want to examine the eects of
income and inequality on revenue use in political spheres where the poor have as much inuence
as the rich. As a robustness check, I divide the sample into municipality-years with socialist
party mayors and those without, and estimate the same model. On average, about 17% of mu-
nicipalities have a socialist party mayor, dened as an elected mayor whose party aliation is one
of the following ve: PDT, PT, PSB, PPS, or PCdoB.40 These are left-wing, grass-roots parties.
There is not a signicant relationship between per capita expenditure and having a socialist party
mayor, after controlling for municipality xed eects, median income, and population. However,
these parties have historically pursued policies aligned with what blue-collar workers indicate
they want in opinion polls. Socialist party mayors are likely to be elected precisely because the
poor are equally- or relatively more-politically involved compared to the rich. An advantage
of this analysis is that I have accurate, time-varying data for the full sample. I leverage o of
within-municipality changes in the party in power over time.
Appendix Table A.2 presents these regression results. I examine the same three dependent
variables as in the PB analysis, and the ndings are nearly identical. Whether or not there is a
socialist party mayor, richer municipalities are less likely to use an exogenous revenue increase
to boost education spending or pre-primary enrollment, and more likely to improve pre-primary
quality. These results are always signicant at the 0.01 level. Again, the estimates on income
interacted with revenue are signicantly smaller in magnitude (closer to 0) for the sub-sample
of municipalities with socialist party mayors (for which the political channel is suppressed) than
40In order of frequency, the Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democr atico Trabalhista, PDT), Workers' Party
(Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT), Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB), Socialist Popular
Party (Partido Popular Socialista, PPS), and Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil, PCdoB).
30for the non-socialist party municipalities. The dierence is statistically signicant at the 0.15
level for public pre-primary enrollment, and at the 0.02 level for public pre-primary quality and
education spending. Thus, both channels appear to be operative, and their relative importance
is remarkably similar to the PB analysis despite the fact that this is a much larger and more
varied set of municipalities. Given an exogenous revenue increase, richer municipalities are less
likely to expand pre-primary enrollment for two reasons: because they have a collective choice of
less public pre-primary education (about 65% of the eect), and because the poor have relatively
less political power in such settings (about 35% of the eect). In the case of public education
spending, the collective choice channel explains about 60% of the eect of median income on
how revenue is spent, and the political power channel explains about 40%. In the case of public
pre-primary teacher quality, the collective choice channel explains about 84% of the eect, and
the political power channel explains about 16%. Once again, both channels matter.
7.2 Addressing the issue of heterogenous expenditure constraints
While not an issue of identication, one may be concerned that the results are driven in part
by how constrained municipalities are to spend FUNDEF/B receipts on education (as opposed
to another good, or a tax rate reduction). If median income or inequality is correlated with this
constrainedness, the results may be partly mechanical. In this section, I explore this possibility
using two dierent methods, and conclude that the estimated eects are robust.
Recall that a municipality must spend at least 25% of revenue on education, and must
spend all net FUNDEF/B receipts on education. This implies that FUNDEF/B receipts are
more fungible for municipalities spending above-minimally on education before the reform; they
can reduce voluntary education spending in response to a windfall. Doing so eectively allows
them to use some of the windfall on any spending priority (including tax rebates). But this
means that the same education investment is eectively more expensive for a less-constrained
municipality, as there are more potential uses of the money. That is, there is a price eect. While
highly-constrained municipalities include high and low income, equal and unequal municipalities,
a concern is that the intensity of the price eect is correlated with median income or inequality.
31There are a few ways to address this concern. First, I segment the sample by the con-
strainedness of municipalities to spend revenue in the education sector. I then examine whether
the eects of median income and inequality depend on the level of constrainedness. Second, I
show results where education spending per capita takes the place of revenue per capita in the
baseline econometric specication. The rst stage equations then explicitly allow richer or more
unequal municipalities to convert exogenous revenue into education spending dierently. In the
second stage, I then observe how the distribution of income aects the use of education funds
to invest in pre-primary quantity and quality. Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks,
discussed in a moment. Importantly, they both support the baseline analysis.
I divide municipalities into categories of constrainedness as follows. A municipality must
be a net beneciary (`winner') of FUNDEF/B to be constrained. Among winners, completely
unconstrained municipalities (17% of winners) are those that received a windfall in 1998 that was
smaller than their above-minimal education spending in 1997, making the windfall completely
fungible. These municipalities could repeat their 1997 education spending level in 1998, and did
not need to spend past that. Completely constrained municipalities (29%) spent the minimum
on education in 1997, so the entire 1998 windfall had to go to education. Between these two
extremes are municipalities with some above-minimal education spending in 1997, but which
received a 1998 windfall that was larger than this voluntary spending, making the windfall only
partially fungible. These municipalities could reduce above-minimal education spending to zero
in 1998, but were still forced to spend more on education than they did in 1997. I divide these
municipalities into two similarly-sized groups: those constrained to keep their own41 spending on
education at 85-99.9% of its 1997 level (28%), and those constrained to keep their own education
spending 85% of its 1997 level or even less constrained (27%).42
Appendix Table A.1 presents the rst and second stage results for the four subsamples, for
all losers, and for all winners. For parsimony, I show the results with pre-primary enrollment
as the dependent variable, and use median income. The other results are similar. In the rst
41Own means not coming from FUNDEF/B (i.e. total education spending minus net gain from FUNDEF/B).
42Note that this category is distinct from completely unconstrained municipalities, which received less from
FUNDEF than they had in voluntary education spending.
32stage, simulated revenue is again associated with higher observed revenue. In the second stage,
the interactions of median income and inequality with revenue are signicant at the 0.05 level or
higher for winners as a whole, and for all four sub-samples. The coecients 1 and 1 have the
expected negative sign for all of the sub-samples, and their magnitudes are remarkably similar
to the baseline results. 1 is always between -0.05 and -0.11, which is similar to the -0.064 in the
full sample. 1 is always between -0.04 and -0.08, which is similar to the -0.061 in the full sample.
Within each of these sub-samples, municipalities face approximately the same price eects from
FUNDEF/B, and yet inequality and income have similarly-sized eects. It does not appear to
be the case that these coecients are simply picking up the eects of constrainedness.
For the sub-sample of losers from the 1998 reform, revenue interacted with the Gini coef-
cient remains negative and signicant at the 0.05 level (although it is almost 40% smaller in
magnitude than for the full sample). However, revenue interacted with median income is now
insignicant. There are a few possible reasons that these results dier from those for the full
sample|chief among them that it is easier for a winner than a loser to re-optimize. Munici-
palities may vary in their ability to issue new local taxes to ll a hole in the budget; doing so
requires local tax collection infrastructure (which may be scant in the case of a historic reliance
on transfer revenue). While both rich and poor municipalities may wish to raise revenue follow-
ing a FUNDEF/B loss, rich municipalities may raise more|not because of a greater desire to
raise revenue, but simply because of a greater ability to do so. This may explain the fact that 1
is insignicant for the sub-set of losers. However, winners probably oer more insight into the
eects of income and inequality on the use of revenue; for winners, their eects will not pick up
the ability to adjust local tax policy quickly. It is thus meaningful that the results for all winners
are very similar to the results for the full sample, and equally signicant.
There are some drawbacks to this analysis, including weaker rst stage specications. This
motivates a second check that the interactions of revenue with income and inequality are not
simply capturing their correlation with constrainedness to spend revenue on education.
I next study the role of constrainedness by replacing per capita revenue, rit with per capita
education spending in equation (11). Now, the rst stage explicitly allows municipalities to dier
33on how much of an exogenous revenue shock they convert into education spending. Appendix
Table A.3 presents rst and second stage IV results, which use the same excluded instruments.
I compare this table with the baseline results. Once again, 1 and 1 are robustly negative.
Comparing the coecients 1 and 1 to the mean of education spending, and doing the same
for the baseline results, one sees that the magnitude of the eects changes very little.43 This
supports the ndings of the constrainedness sub-sample analysis.
This analysis also has limitations. Simulated revenue may aect public pre-primary in-
vestment through channels other than education spending, violating the exclusion restriction.44
However, it is meaningful that both of these constrainedness analyses conrm the main results.
7.3 Correlates of inequality and income
I treat inequality and median income as broad concepts that summarize important dimensions
of society. However, my ndings may be less interesting if income and inequality are simply
picking up the eect of some variable correlated with them that also conditions how revenue is
spent. For example, they may be correlated with higher initial enrollment in public pre-primary
(`saturation' from the start, and less room for growth), or with urbanization (creating more
economies of scale in provision, and thus more room for enrollment growth).
To ensure that this is not the case, I individually enter four new interactions with revenue
into the model: the 1997 enrollment rate in public pre-primary education, and the year 2000
fraction of the municipality that was urban, labor force participation rate, and index of racial
fractionalization.45 Due to problems of weak instruments, I cannot enter all of these in the same
specication. However, as Appendix Table A.4 shows, their individual inclusion has negligible
eects on the main point estimates and their statistical signicance. My ndings seem to come
from what income and inequality imply for the number of people wanting public pre-primary
education, and from their political inuence, rather than one of these more mechanical channels.
43The same analysis, applied to pre-primary quality, also reveals almost no change in the size of the eects.
44E.g., investment in roads and public transit might boost enrollment by reducing the cost of getting to school.
45Urbanization is as classied by IBGE (2000). Labor force participation is the fraction of the adult population
that is economically active. Racial fractionalization is an ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index (an HHI),
computed using data on the population in each of four categories: black or brown, white, asian, and indigenous.
348 Conclusions
This paper makes two key contributions to our understanding of factors aecting the public
provision of goods for which private substitutes are available (like education and health care). Its
main contribution is an analysis of how an area's income distribution aects how its government
allocates revenue between goods with and without private substitutes. I carry out an empirical
analysis of public investment in Brazil's over 5,000 municipalities during 1995-2008. I focus on
pre-primary education, for which private substitutes are readily available. My study circumvents
two problems which have impacted related empirical studies: the tendency for the provision and
quality of such goods to be highly-regulated by the national government (masking local policy
preferences), and the endogeneity of public sector revenue (which is required to fund them).
Pre-primary education in Brazil is a unique good over which municipalities have true investment
discretion. To address endogeneity issues, I exploit a 1998 change in Brazil's education nance
law that generates exogenous variation in municipalities' revenue. Specically, I form a simulated
instrumental variable that encapsulates the credibly exogenous variation in revenue generated
by the law, but excludes variation due to the municipalities' own actions. I instrument for actual
(endogenous) revenue with the simulated instrument, thereby testing how dierent municipalities
dierentially spend an exogenous shock to revenue. I nd that an exogenous revenue increase
attributable to the law change causes municipalities to spend more on education and to increase
public pre-primary enrollment. However, richer and more unequal municipalities are signicantly
less likely to expand education spending and public pre-primary enrollment. The funds they do
not spend on education are signicantly more likely to end up in public infrastructure like parks
and roads, which do not have private sector substitutes.
The paper's secondary contribution is an attempt to apportion the estimated eects of the
distribution of income between two channels described in existing literatures: a collective choice
channel and a political power channel. The collective choice channel hypothesizes that societies
with higher income and more unequal income simply have more people who consume a private
sector version of publicly-provided goods. Because they are consuming private versions, they
vote for low spending on the public sector counterparts, leading to less of them under majority
35voting. The political power channel hypothesizes that people have control over public policy that
is roughly proportionate to their share of income, as opposed to their share of votes. Thus, the
poor may have little ability to make government publicly supply the goods they most demand
(including public education), especially as others grow richer relative to them. The existing
literature says little about the relative importance of each channel. This is problematic because
they do not necessarily imply the same socially-optimal policy interventions to address low equi-
librium provision. To shed light on the role of each channel, I make use of the fact that some
municipalities use Participatory Budgeting (PB), allowing citizens to vote over expenditures. To
the extent that PB reduces the ability of the rich to buy disproportionate political inuence, its
presence suppresses the political power channel. Thus, the remaining eects are likely due to
the collective choice channel. My estimates suggest that the political power channel accounts for
about 30% of the eects, and the collective choice channel for about 70%. Both channels play
an important role in determining how the distribution of income aects public investment.
These ndings have at least two important policy implications. First, revenue transfers
that target the poorest local governments and those with the lowest income inequality are likely
to be most eective in expanding public education investment and pre-primary enrollment. Pol-
icymakers in those municipalities already have a relatively strong desire to spend their next R$
on these uses. Any education nance equalization program should take this into account. In the
Brazilian case, it would seem that a nation-wide education nance equalization reform would
target the poorest municipalities better than a within-state distribution like FUNDEF/B. Sec-
ond, governance reforms that ensure everyone an equal voice in policymaking do matter and can
aect policy outcomes. In particular, they seem to empower those who use publicly-provided
goods with private substitutes, like education or health care.
36Figure 1: Fraction of Brazilian Children in Formal Pre-Primary Education Institutions, 1995-
2008
(a) Ages 0-3, Cr eche Education
(b) Ages 4-6, Preschool Education
Notes: Enrollment is in any type of pre-primary school (public or private), and based on parental self-reports.
The vertical line indicates the implementation of the FUNDEF school reform in 1998.
Sources: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) (1995-2008), with calculations performed by
author.











Notes: Cr eche (Preschool) access is the rate of enrollment in school (public or private) for children aged 0-3 (aged
4-6), based on parental self-reports.
Sources: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) (2008), with calculations performed and maps
drawn by author.
38Figure 3: Partial Regression Plots with Quadratic Fit, Showing How Enrollment in Formal




Notes: X is a vector of controls including child age and gender, household size, municipality xed eects, and
household head gender, migration status, years of education dummies, race dummies, and age dummies. Units
of income (x-axis) are 100s of 2000 Reais. 95% condence intervals appear as dashed lines.
Sources: 2000 Brazilian Census, 11.7% sample (IBGE).
39Figure 4: Number of New Public Pre-Primary Students that Municipalities At Dierent Levels
of Income and Inequality Would Enroll if the Median Municipality Enrolled 100 New Students
Notes: This gure presents two line graphs, both created using three coecients (Revenue, Revenue  median income, and Revenue
 gini) from column (5) of Table 8. For each graph, I assume that municipalities at each decile receive the same inux of revenue, and
that this inux is large enough to compel the median municipality (50th percentile) to enroll 100 new public pre-primary students.
This amount of revenue is not necessarily the same in the two graphs. For the median income graph, I assume that inequality takes
the sample median value. For the inequality graph, I assume that median income takes the sample median value.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from IBGE, INEP, and Tesouro Nacional.
Figure 5: Expenditure on Education and on Infrastructure in Municipalities At Dierent Levels
of Income and Inequality if the Median Income Municipality Spends 1 R$
Notes: This gure presents two line graphs, both created using three coecients (Revenue, Revenue  median income, and Revenue
 gini) from Table 10. The education spending graph comes from column (4) and the infrastructure spending graph comes from
column (8). For each graph, I assume that municipalities at each decile receive the same inux of revenue, and that this inux
compels the median income municipality (50th percentile) to spend 1 R$ on the relevant spending category. This amount of revenue
is not necessarily the same in the two dierent line graphs. I assume that inequality takes the sample median value.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from IBGE, INEP, and Tesouro Nacional.
40Table 1: Means of Quality Variables, Which Suggest that Private Pre-Primary Education is of
Higher Quality than Public
Measure of Quality Private Public Dierence
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-primary students per pre-primary teacher 15.3 18.3 3.1
(0.062) (0.045) (0.083)**
Fraction of pre-primary teachers with post-secondary education 0.231 0.197 -0.035
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)**
Fraction of pre-primary institutions with own school building 0.979 0.949 -0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)**
Fraction of pre-primary institutions with electricity 0.997 0.903 -0.095
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)**
Fraction of pre-primary institutions with indoor bathroom 0.960 0.799 -0.161
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)**
Fraction of pre-primary institutions with library 0.623 0.197 -0.427
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)**
Fraction of pre-primary institutions with computer 0.849 0.370 -0.479
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)**
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates p<.01.
Sources: Author's calculations based on school- and teacher-level data from the 2008 Census of Schools
(Censo Escolar).
Table 2: Number of Municipalities, by Tercile of Income Per Capita and Tercile of Net Per-Child
Receipts (Net Per-Child Benets) from FUNDEF Education Finance Reform, 1998
Lowest Receipts Middle Receipts Highest Receipts
Poorest 51 372 710
Middle 664 695 369
Richest 638 286 273
Total 1353 1353 1352
Notes: The total number of municipalities in the table is smaller than the national total, due to missing data on
per capita municipal income or per-capita FUNDEF receipts data.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from Tesouro Nacional and IBGE (1998).
41Table 3: Number of Municipalities, by 1997 Education Spending as % of Revenue and 1997
Transfers as % of Revenue, Showing How Crowd-Out of Local Revenue with FUNDEF Revenue
Was Limited
Transfers as % of Revenue
<75 % (75-85] % (85-90] % (90-95] % (95-100] % Total
Panel A: All Municipalities
>32.5% 53 86 87 168 270 664
(30, 32.5]% 58 106 90 123 182 559
Education Spending (27.5, 30]% 122 186 140 180 235 863
as % of Revenue (25, 27.5]% 172 245 175 229 269 1,090
25% 597 544 263 248 214 1,866
Total 1,002 1,167 755 948 1,170 5,042
Panel B: Predicted Net Beneciaries of FUNDEF
>32.5% 42 56 65 125 245 533
(30, 32.5]% 30 63 54 89 153 389
Education Spending (27.5, 30]% 70 101 65 87 162 485
as % of Revenue (25, 27.5]% 75 112 77 106 165 535
25% 303 214 95 99 130 841
Total 520 546 356 506 855 2,783
Notes: 25% of revenue is the imposed minimum expenditure on education, and thus the lowest expen-
diture category. Predicted net beneciaries are municipalities that, as of 1997, would receive more from
FUNDEF than they were required to pay in if the rules of FUNDEF were applied to 1997 enrollment
and revenue levels.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from Tesouro Nacional (1997).
Table 4: Correlation Matrix, Measures of Income and Inequality
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Average income per capita, 10,000s of 2005 Reais 1.0
(2) Median income per capita in 2000, 10,000s of 2005 Reais 0.72 1.0










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.1: Results by Sub-sample of Constrainedness, Showing How Income and Inequality
Moderate the Eect of Revenue on Public Pre-Primary Enrollment
All All Completely < 85% 85-99.9% Completely
losers winners unconstrained constrained constrained constrained
winners winners winners winners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: First Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Municipal per capita revenue (mean = 9.61)
Simulated revenue 0.401 0.515 -0.405 -0.157 0.913 0.878
(0.347) (0.224)* (0.874) (0.318) (0.371)* (0.438)*
Simulated revenue x med income 1.135 2.334 3.031 1.942 2.550 2.111
(0.263)** (0.226)** (0.585)** (0.814)* (0.391)** (0.341)**
Simulated revenue x gini -0.201 -1.126 0.930 0.759 -2.285 -1.841
(0.843) (0.561)* (2.146) (0.787) (0.910)* (1.098)+
Observations 28870 29655 4923 7856 8200 8676
Municipalities 2225 2357 390 637 651 679
F-Statistic, Excluded Instruments 144.16 109.60 29.07 13.79 13.64 57.32
Panel B: Second Stage Results
Dependent Variable: Fraction of 0-6 population enrolled in a municipal pre-primary school (mean = 0.23)
Revenue 0.006 0.047 0.024 0.066 0.049 0.032
(0.008) (0.007)** (0.014)+ (0.019)** (0.013)** (0.012)**
Revenue x median income 0.012 -0.080 -0.061 -0.065 -0.113 -0.049
(0.008) (0.007)** (0.015)** (0.031)* (0.031)** (0.011)**
Revenue x gini -0.037 -0.076 -0.036 -0.076 -0.079 -0.063
(0.019)* (0.014)** (0.027) (0.021)** (0.014)** (0.028)*
Observations 28754 30122 4909 7844 8176 8665
Municipalities 2222 2402 390 637 651 679
Notes: An observation is a municipality - year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the
municipality level. All specications include municipality and year xed eects, as well as a linear time trend interacted
with the pre-reform, 1997 levels of per capita revenue, per capita transfer revenue, the fraction of public primary school
students in state or federal (non-municipal) schools, pre-primary enrollment, and pre-primary enrollment squared. **
indicates p<.01; * indicates p<.05; + indicates p<.10. The mean of simulated revenue per capita is 6.45, the mean
of 1997 average per capita income is 0.49, the mean of 2000 median per capita income is 0.22, and the mean Gini
coecient is 0.39.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































53B Institutional Detail: Pre-Primary Education in Brazil,
FUNDEF, and FUNDEB
In 1985, Brazil began a process of re-democratization following military dictatorship. The gov-
ernment put forth a new constitution in 1988, and decentralized substantial power to state and
municipal governments. As of 2000, there were 5,507 municipalities. Municipal governments are
led by an elected mayor and an elected city council comprised of a minimum of nine and a max-
imum of 55 councilmen, according to population size. Local elections are competitive and held
every four years, and voting is compulsory for those over 17. Everyone 16 and older can vote.
The mayoral candidate with the largest vote share is elected (with runo elections in municipal-
ities with populations over 200,000 if no candidate wins at least 50% of the vote). City council
seats are lled by a system of open-list proportional representation. Legislative, budgetary, and
administrative authority are concentrated in the mayor's oce, and the city council is largely
responsible for approving mayoral directives (Couto and Abrucio 1995; Wampler 2007).
The federal government has placed a lot of emphasis on pre-primary education over the last
two decades. The 1988 Brazilian constitution formally recognized age 0-6 education as the right
of every child and the responsibility of municipal governments. The 1996 National Education
Guidelines and Frameworks Law emphasized the educational value of pre-primary education by
formally integrating cr eches (age 0-3) and preschools (age 0-6, and 0-5 starting in 2007) under
the Ministry of Education. National enthusiasm for pre-primary education has been spurred on
by an alarming rate of failure out of rst grade: 29.3 percent as of 2001 (UNESCO 2006). This
compares unfavorably even with most Sub-Saharan African countries, which have the world's
highest regional average failure rate. Additionally, Brazil performs far below peers with similar
per capita GDP on Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests. With a lot of
studies emerging saying that early childhood education can equip children with the cognitive and
non-cognitive skills required for success in primary school and beyond, the government has been
keen to capitalize on this. Souza (2005), Minister of Education during 1995-2002, describes the
federal government's motivations for greater education investment and monitoring of performance
indicators.
Despite this rhetoric, however, the federal government has largely recused itself from pre-
primary education policy. Part of this is an artefact of the 1988 Constitution, which gave consid-
erable policy autonomy to municipal governments. As Plank (1996) notes: \The Constitution'
concession of independence to municipalities signicantly reduces the power both of the Ministry
of Education and state governments, while greatly expanding opportunity for administrative and
policy innovation." Political pressure for municipal autonomy had been building during the 20
years of military rule preceding the 1988 Constitution. About 54% of the congressmen drafting
the 1988 Constitution had been previously involved in local politics as mayors or city council-
men, and they wanted to nancially weaken the federal government. Souza (2002) notes, \The
1988 Constitution incorporated municipalities as part of the federation together with the states,
reecting a tradition of municipal autonomy and little state control in municipal matters."
The federal government has interfered in municipal education policy by imposing an ed-
ucation spending oor: at least 25% of municipal revenue from any source|local or transfer
revenue. The federal government has also passed several education nance reform laws. In
1998, the government implemented the \Fund for the Development of Elementary Education and
Teachers" (Fundo de Manuten c~ ao e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valoriza c~ ao
do Magist erio), or FUNDEF. This policy was expanded in the 2007 \Fund for the Development
54and Maintenance of Basic Education" (Fundo de Manuten c~ ao e Desenvolvimento da Educa c~ ao
B asica), or FUNDEB.
FUNDEF obligated each of Brazil's state and municipal governments to pay 15% of each
of four intergovernmental transfers into a state-level education fund. These four transfer receipts
were typically the largest four sources of transfer revenue for municipal governments, and in-
cluded: transfers from the municipal participation fund (FPM), the tax on goods and services
(ICMS), the tax on industrialized products (IPI), and transfers under the complementary law. In
Portuguese, these are the Fundo de Compensacao dos Estados Exportadores (IPI), the Imposto
Sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e Servicos (ICMS), the Parte do Fundo de Participacao dos
Municipios (FPM), and the Lei Complementar (LC 87/96) transfer. The federal government
sets IPI tax rates and the state government sets ICMS tax rates subject to federal minima and
maxima. FPM is known as the \Revenue Sharing Fund of the Municipalities." Of the federal
government's proceeds from the collection of taxes on income and earnings and on industrialized
products, 22.5% is given to Brazil's municipalities as an FPM transfer. In most municipalities,
these four transfers form the majority of the municipal revenue base. In some sense, these are
local taxes; the state and federal governments set the rates and bases, and actually collect the
taxes, but they then transfer the revenue to municipalities on the basis of its municipality of
origin. These payments into the school fund did count toward the 25% of revenue that must be
spent on education, but municipalities also had to spend 25% of all other revenue (from sources
other than these four transfers), and an additional 10% of these four transfers, on education. For
more details, see Gordon and Vegas (2005), Estevan (2007), and UNESCO (2007).
FUNDEF generated 27 education funds: one for each state, and one for the Federal Dis-
trict. Fund receipts were redistributed back to municipalities within each state so that each
governments's share of the pie was equal to its share of the state's total enrolled primary school
children. The state government itself also paid into the fund by the same set of rules, and also
claimed a share of the pie equal to its share of students (although state governments are generally
less involved in primary education). All fund receipts had to be spent on education. Additionally,
60% of fund receipts had to be spent exclusively on teacher compensation. Each municipality
was also required to establish a council that would oversee expenditures (Sands 2008). If gross
fund receipts alone were not enough to achieve a federal minimum investment level per primary
school child (set annually), the federal government would `top o' the fund to ensure minimal
primary school expenditure per child. Importantly, this federal `top-o' ensured that primary
education was already universal and of minimal required quality before the municipality spent
the 10% or more of additional revenue mandated by the 1988 Constitution's 25% spending oor
on education. As UNESCO (2007) notes, the intention was that states would spend this addi-
tional (non-school fund) money on secondary education, and municipalities would spend it on
pre-primary education and other education-related expenditures.
On December 23, 1997, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Minister of Education
Paulo Renato Souza issued a decree announced the amount of the federal top-o policy that would
be put into eect for 1998 (and would be revised periodically). FUNDEF was implemented at
the start of the new school year in 1998, with municipal receipts from the fund based on the
1997 Census of Schools (Censo Escolar) enrollments data.
In 2007, FUNDEB increased the fraction of transfer revenue to be contributed to the state
education fund: from 15% in 2006 to 16.67% in 2007, 18.33% in 2008, and 20% in 2009 onward.
Also, while FUNDEF only considered primary school students in assigning capitation grants,
FUNDEB expanded this to include pre-primary, primary, and secondary school students.
55C Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Lemma. I compute the level of income x such that a household with income x is







~ x is larger than 0 and depends positively on E[s]. If x is greater (smaller) than ~ x, u[x;T;e;0]
is greater (smaller) than u[x;T;0;E[s]], and the household prefers private (public) education,
which proves the Lemma.
Description of the Probabilistic Voting Mechanism.
Under probabilistic voting, I assume there are two political parties, p and q. Each party
proposes a policy: sp and sq. These values of education quality imply fractions of public revenue
going to education of T p and T q, respectively. A voter with income x experiences a utility gain
of u[x;T q;e;sq] u[x;T p;e;sp] if party q wins the election instead of party p. The median voter
model assumes that a voter votes for party q with probability 1 if this dierence is positive.
Probabilistic voting theory supposes that this vote is uncertain. The probability that a person






where F is an increasing and dierentiable cumulative distribution function. This function cap-
tures the idea that voters care not only about the specic policy platform of each party, but also
about an \ideology" variable. This concern for ideology is independent of the policy choice at
hand, and makes the political choice inherently less predictable. The probability of voting for
party q increases gradually as party q's platform becomes more attractive, and each party's vote
share varies continuously with the proposed policy platform. This leads to smooth aggregation
of all voters' preferences instead of sole dependence on the preferences of the median voter.
Both parties maximize their expected vote share, given by
R 1
0 g[x]F()dx. As the parties
act symmetrically in equilibrium, T = T p = T q and s = sp = sq. The maximization program of







The weight (F)0(0) captures the responsiveness of voters to a change in utility. Voters may be
relatively non-responsive if they are highly ideologically biased, which means they do not punish
or reward politicians much for economic policies that aect their utility. Policymakers accordingly
place greater weight on the utility functions of less-ideological voters. The non-ideological voters
most targeted by policymakers therefore enjoy disproportionate political power. Political power
may additionally depend on features of the voting system, such as who has voting rights or who
can oer campaign contributions to the policymaker. I can more broadly capture the relative
political power of voters by introducing a parameter [x]. The resulting objective function









For simplicity, I assume all voters have the same political power, which implies [x] = 1, and gives
me the maximization problem in (8). It can be shown that 
[s] is strictly concave. Replacing
~ x with 2	 + 1 + r    in the objective, taking the rst-order condition for a maximum, and
solving for s yields equation (9). From the budget constraint, I then get equation (10).
Discussion of the Equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the choice of whether or not to participate in public school must be optimal.
From the Lemma, the incentive to use private schooling is increasing in income. As a consequence,
any equilibrium is characterized by an income threshold ~ x below which parents choose public
education and above which they choose private education. This leads to the following denition
of an equilibrium:
Denition (Equilibrium). An equilibrium consists of an income threshold ~ x satisfying equa-
tion (5), a private education decision e = 0 for x < ~ x and e = e[x] for x > ~ x, and aggregate
variables (	;s;T) given by equations (6), (9), and (10), such that perfect foresight holds:
E[s] = s (19)
Proposition A.1. (Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium). An equilibrium
exists and is unique.
The intuition for this result is simple. Equations (5) and (6) show that participation in
public schooling is a continuously increasing function of expected public school quality. However,
equation (9) shows that actual public school quality is a continuous and decreasing function of
participation. Combining these results, I can construct a continuous and decreasing mapping
from expected to actual school quality. The mapping has a unique xed point, which characterizes
the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition A.1. The result follows from an application of Brouwer's xed
point theorem. By equation (9), the equilibrium expected public school quality E[s] and the











I now dene a mapping  from E[s] into s, which maps this interval into itself. A unique
equilibrium exists if this mapping has a unique xed point.
Given E[s], according to the Lemma and to equation (6), the fraction of families partici-

















57This function is weakly increasing in E[s]; the higher the expected quality of public education,
the more parents are going to prefer using the public sector.
I can now use equation (9) to map the expected education quality E[s] into the actual
education quality s that would result if 	(E[s]) of families participated in the public system.
This education quality s = (E[s]) is given by:
(E[s]) =
y












An equilibrium is characterized by a xed point of (E[s]), which is a schooling level s that
satises s = (s) so that the perfect foresight condition holds and parents expect a quality level
s that is identical to the one implemented by the political process. Given equation (22),  is a
continuous, weakly decreasing function, mapping the closed interval given in equation (20) into
itself. The mapping therefore crosses the 45-degree line exactly once, and a unique equilibrium
exists.
This assumption is common to most of the public nance literature on the public provision
of education in a dual-provision regime. Since participation in public schools far exceeds 50% in
nearly all countries, the literature notes that this is the empirically relevant case.
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. If I assume an interior solution (parameter values
such that 	 2 (0;1)), I can solve for 	 explicitly. There are two solutions, but only one is
positive:
	 =




 + ((1 + r   )   2)2
4
(23)
This formula allows me to write s and T as functions of the exogenous parameters. Taking
partials and cross-partials of this expression, and of the expression for s and T, with respect to
r, , and y, I establish Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
From these explicit formulas, the following proposition also follows:
Proposition A.2. (Revenue, income, inequality, and public education). The













58D Construction of Simulated Instrumental Variables
The construction of the simulated revenue variable follows techniques standard to the public
nance literature. The exact redistribution algorithms dened by the FUNDEF (1998) and
FUNDEB (2007) education nance reform laws provide me with an exogenous source of variation
in municipal per capita revenue during 1998-2008. This variation is exogenous precisely because
these laws were enacted by the federal government without regard for any specic municipality
or state's revenue or education policies.
The FUNDEF law dened how revenue would be redistributed within states in a very
careful algorithm, detailed in Minist erio da Educa c~ ao (2006). For 1998-1999, having data on
the following variables allows one to determine how each municipality will fare under FUNDEF:
total revenue of each municipality in the state, total revenue of the state government itself, total
children enrolled in municipal primary schools in each municipality in the state, total children
enrolled in state primary schools in the state, and the annually-set federal `minimum expenditure
per primary school student' amount. Given these variables alone, one can determine exactly
which municipalities will be net winners, which will be net losers, and by how much.
During 2000-2004, the algorithm began to make the federal top-o amount vary based on
the primary school level of students. Children in grades 1-4 of primary school were weighted
dierently than children in grades 5-8. During 2005-2006, the algorithm began to make federal
top-o depend not only on the primary school level, but also on urbanization status. Thus,
one would additionally need to know how many children were enrolled in grades 1-4 of urban
primary schools, how many were enrolled in grades 1-4 of rural primary schools, how many were
enrolled in grades 5-8 of urban primary schools, and how many were enrolled in grade 5-8 of
rural primary schools. Beginning in 2007, under FUNDEB, the algorithm was complicated even
more, to depend (in addition to all these previous factors) on the number of children enrolled in
urban vs. rural creches, preschools, secondary schools, and adult education (EJA). Fortunately,
the annual Census of Schools contains all of the required information, as it is the basis for the
distribution of FUNDEF funds. Minist erio da Educa c~ ao (2008) describes the changes initiated
in 2007.
While the laws induced endogenous municipal responses, I can simulate the municipality's
virtual tax revenue by using the exact algorithms of the laws in each year, but using pre-reform
(1997) data on revenue and enrollments. To better predict how enrollments will expand over
the sample period without introducing endogenous information, I exploit the nation-wide rate
at which municipal governments took over the state's role in primary education during 1998-
2008. Primary education is usually run by municipal governments, but the state government
is involved in some municipalities more than in others. I wanted to account for the fact that
some municipalities had a greater potential to secure higher revenue through take-over than did
others. The federal rate of takeover is exogenous to pre-primary education policy in any given
municipality. However, by taking this into account and thus allowing simulated revenue to grow
more in municipalities with heavy initial state and federal involvement in primary education in the
pre-period, I can better predict revenue without drawing on any one municipality's endogenous
response to the reforms.
The additional instruments are computed simply by interacting simulated revenue with the
following variables: year 2000 median per capita household income, year 1997 average per capita
income, the 2000 mean income divided by the 2000 median income, the 2000 Gini coecient,
and the 2000 DER income polarization index.
59References
[1] Aboud, Frances E. (2006). \Evaluation of an Early Childhood Preschool Programme in Rural
Bangladesh." Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 21: p. 46-60.
[2] Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999). \Public Goods and Ethnic
Divisions." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): p. 1243-1284.
[3] Anderson, Michael L. (2008). \Multiple Inference and Gender Dierences in the Eects of Early
Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects,"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 103(484): p. 1481-1495.
[4] Abdelkrim, Araar and Jean-Yves Duclos (2007). \DASP: Distributive Analysis Stata Pack-
age," PEP, World Bank, UNDP, and Universit e Laval.
[5] Ames, Barry (2001). The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press.
[6] Armecin, Graeme, Jere Behrman, and Paulita Duazo (2006). \Early Childhood Devel-
opment Through Integrated Programmes: Evidence From the Philippines." World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper, No. 3922.
[7] Avritzer, Leonardo (2009). Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
[8] Auyero, Javier (2001). Poor People's Politics: Peronist Suvival Networks and the Legacy of
Evita. Durham: Duke University Press.
[9] Banerjee, Abhijit and Rohini Somanathan (2007). \The political economy of public goods:
Some evidence from India." Journal of Development Economics, 82: p. 287-314.
[10] Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2006). \Pro-poor Targeting and Accountability of
Local Governments in West Bengal." Journal of Development Economics, 79: p. 303-327.
[11] Bartels, Larry (2009). \Economic Equality and Political Representation." In Lawrence R. Jacobs
and Desmond S. King, eds., The Unsustainable American State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[12] Barzel, Yoram (1973). \Private Schools and Public School Finance." The Journal of Political
Economy, 81(1): p. 174-186.
[13] Bates, Robert (1973). Ethnicity in Contemporary Africa. Monograph, Program of Eastern
African Studies, XIV, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Aairs: Syracuse University.
[14] Bates, Robert (1976), Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of a Village in Zambia.
Yale University Press, New Haven.
[15] Bates, Robert (1981), States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural
Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press, Series on Social Choice and Political Economy.
[16] Benabou, Roland (2000). \Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract."
American Economic Review, 90(1): p. 96-129.
60[17] Berlinski, Samuel, Sebastian Galiani, and Marco Manacorda (2008). \Giving Children
a Better Start: Preschool Attendance and School-Age Proles." Journal of Public Economics,
92(5-6): p. 1416-1440.
[18] Berlinski, Samuel, Sebastian Galiani, and Paul Gertler (2009). \The Eect of Pre-primary
Education on Primary School Performance." Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2): p. 219-234.
[19] Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1991). \Public Provision of Private Goods and the
Redistribution of Income." The American Economic Review 81(4): p. 979-984.
[20] Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002). \The Political Economy of Government Re-
sponsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): p.
1415-1451.
[21] Blundell, Richard, Alan Duncan, and Costas Meghir (1998). \Estimating Labor Supply
Responses to Using Tax Reforms." Econometrica, 66(4): p. 827-861.
[22] Boulding, Carew and Brian Wampler (2010). \Voices, Votes, and Resources: Evaluating the
Eect of Participatory Democracy on Well-being." World Development, 38(1): p. 125-135.
[23] Campbell, Frances A., Craig T. Ramey, Elizabeth Pungello, Joseph Sparling, and
Shari Miller-Johnson (2002). \Early Childhood Education: Young Adult Outcomes from the
Abecedarian Project." Applied Developmental Science, 6(1): p. 42-57.
[24] Card, David, and Abigail Payne (2002). \School Finance Reform, the Distribution of School
Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores." Journal of Public Economics, 83: p. 49-82.
[25] Carneiro, Pedro Manuel, and James Heckman 2003. \Human Capital Policy." In James
Heckman and Anne Krueger, eds., Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies?
Boston: MIT Press.
[26] Cascio, Elizabeth (2009). \Do Investments in Universal Early Education Pay O? Long-term
Eects of Introducing Kindergartens into Public Schools." NBER Working Paper No. 14951.
[27] Chambers, Robert (1983). Rural Development: Putting the Last First. New York: Prentice Hall.
[28] Chandra, Kanchan (2004). Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in
India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[29] Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hilger, Emmanuel Saez, Diane Whitmore
Schanzenbach, and Danny Yagan (2010). \How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Aect
Your Earnings? Evidence from Project Star." NBER Working Paper 16381.
[30] Couto, Cl audio, and Fernando Luiz Abrucio (1995). Governando a Cidade? A For ca e a
Fraqueza da C^ amara Municipal." S~ ao Paulo em Perspectiva, 9, p. 57-65.
[31] Cunha, F., J. Heckman, L. Lochner, and D. Masterov (2006). \Interpreting the Evidence
on Life Cycle Skill Formation." In E. Hanushek and F. Welch, eds., Handbook of the Economics of
Education. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[32] Currie, Janet (2001), \Early Childhood Education Programs." Journal of Economic Perspectives,
15: p. 213-238.
61[33] Currie, Janet and Thomas, Duncan (1995), \Does Head Start Make a Dierence?" American
Economic Review, 85: p. 341-364.
[34] Engle, Patrice L., Maureen M. Black, Jere R. Behrman, Meena Cabral de Mello, Paul
J. Gertler, Lydia Kapiriri, Reynaldo Martorell, and Mary Eming Young (2007). \Child
Development in Developing Countries." The Lancet, 369: p. 229-242.
[35] Epple, Dennis, and Richard Romano (1996). \Ends Against the Middle: Determining Public
Service Provision When There are Private Alternatives." Journal of Public Economics, 62: p.
297-325.
[36] Estevan, Fernanda (2007). \The Quality of Public Education and Private school Enrollment:
An Assessment Using Brazilian Data." Working Paper.
[37] Evans, David and Katrina Kosec (2010). \Access to Early Childhood Education in Brazil."
Working Paper.
[38] Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2009a). \Electoral Accountability and Corruption:
Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments." NBER Working Paper 14937.
[39] Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2009b). \Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Mon-
etary Incentives on Quality and Performance." NBER Working Paper 14906.
[40] Ferreira, Francisco H.G., Peter Lanjouw, and Marcelo Neri (2003). \A New Poverty Prole
for Brazil Using PPV, PNAD and Census Data." Revista Brasileira de Economia, 57(1): p. 59-92.
[41] Fitzpatrick, Maria D. (2008). \Starting School at Four: The Eect of Universal Pre-
Kindergarten on Children's Academic Achievement." The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and
Policy, 8(1).
[42] Foster, Andrew and Mark Rosenzweig (2002). \Democratization, Decentralization and the
Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy." BREAD Working Paper No. 010.
[43] Glomm, Ravikumar and Gerhard Glomm (1998). \Opting Out of Publicly Provided Services:
A Majority Voting Result." Social Choice Welfare, 15: p. 187-199.
[44] Gordon, Nora (2004). \Do Federal Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence from Title I."
Journal of Public Economics, 88(9-10): p. 1771-1792.
[45] Gordon, Nora, and Emiliana Vegas (2005). \Educational Finance, Equalization, Spending,
Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes: The Case of Brazil's FUNDEF." In Incentives to Improve
Teaching: Lessons From Latin America, Ed. Emiliana Vegas. The World Bank: Washington, D.C.
[46] Gormley, William Jr., Deborah Phillips, Shirley Adelstein, and Catherine Shaw (2010).
\Head Start's Comparative Advantage: Myth or Reality?" Forthcoming, Policy Studies Journal.
[47] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman (1994). \Protection For Sale" The American Eco-
nomic Review, 84(4): p. 833-850.
[48] Gutierrez, Catalina, and Ryuichi Tanaka (2009). \Inequality and Education Decisions in
Developing Countries" Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Inequality, 7: p. 55-81.
[49] Heckman, James and Dimitriy V. Masterov (2007). \The Productivity Argument for In-
vesting in Young Children." Working Paper.
62[50] Hoxby, Caroline M. (2001). \All School Finance Equalizations are not Created Equal." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116(4): p. 1289-1231.
[51] Instituto Brasileiro de Geograa e Estat stica (IBGE) (2007). \2007 Regional Accounts Re-
port." http : ==www:ibge:gov:br=english=estatistica=economia=contasregionais=20032007=default:shtm
[52] Jarelot, Christophe (2003). Indias Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North
India. New York: Columbia University Press.
[53] Jaramillo, Adriana and Karen Tietjen (2001). \Early Childhood Development in Africa: Can
We Do More or Less? A Look at the Impact and Implications of Preschools in Cape Verde and
Guinea." World Bank, Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series.
[54] Jha, Saumitra, Vijayendra Rao, and Michael Woolcock (2007). \Governance in the Gullies:
Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums." World Development, 35(2): p. 230-
246.
[55] Keefer, Philip, and Stuti Khemani (2005). \Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor:
Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services." The World Bank Research Ob-
server, 20(1): p. 1-27.
[56] Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer (1997). \Does Inequality Harm Growth Only in Democra-
cies? A Replication and Extension." American Journal of Political Science, 41(1): p. 323-332.
[57] Knudson, Eric, James Heckman, Judy Cameron, and Jack Shonko (2006). \Economic,
Neurobiological, and Behavioral Perspectives on Building America Future Workforce." Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(27): p. 10155-10162.
[58] Love, John M. Kisker, Ellen Eliason, Christine Ross, Helen Raikes, Jill Constantine,
Kimberly Boller, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Rachel Chazan-Cohen, Louisa Banks Tarullo,
Christy Brady-Smith, Allison Sidle Fuligni, Peter Z. Schochet, Diane Paulsell, and
Cheri Vogel (2005). \The Eectiveness of Early Head Start for 3-year-old Children and their
Parents: Lessons for Policy and Programs." Developmental Psychology, 41(6): p. 885-901.
[59] Mansuri, Ghazala and Vijayendra Rao (2004). \Community-Based and -Driven Development:
A Critical Review." The World Bank Research Observer, 19(1): p. 1-39.
[60] Mart nez-Fritscher, Andr e, Aldo Musacchio, and Martina Viarengo (2010). \The Great
Leap Forward: The Political Economy of Education in Brazil, 1889-1930."
[61] Melo, Marcus Andr e (2009). \Democratizing Budgeting Decisions and Execution in Brazil:
More Participatation or Redesign of Formal Institutions?" In Andrew Selee and Enrique Peruzzotti,
eds., Participatory Innovation and Representative Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press.
[62] Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981). \A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." Journal
of Political Economy, 89(5): p. 914-927.
[63] Minist erio da Educa c~ ao (2008). \FUNDEB: Manual de Orienta c~ ao."
http : ==www:fnde:gov:br=index:php=fundeb   publicacoes
[64] Minist erio da Educa c~ ao (2006). \Legisla c~ ao."
http : ==www:fnde:gov:br=index:php=fundef   legislacao
63[65] Patrinos, Harry A. (2007). \The Living Conditions of Children." World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 4251.
[66] Plank, David N. (1996). The Means of Our Salvation: Public Education in Brazil, 1930-1995.
Boulder: Westview Press.
[67] Rock, David (1996). \Machine Politics in Buenos Aires and the Argentine Radical Party, 1912-
1930." Journal of Latin American Studies,, 4(2): p. 233-256.
[68] Sands, Joseph C. Jr. (2008). \Education Funding in a Recentralizing Democracy: A Cautionary
Tale of Four Brazilian Cities." Latin American Politics and Society, 50(3): p. 93-120.
[69] Schweinhart, L., Montie, J., Xiang, Z., Barnett, W. S., Beleld, C., and Nores, M.
(2005). \Lifetime Eects: The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 40." Ypsilanti,
Michigan: High/Scope Press.
[70] Shah, Anwar (2007). Participatory Budgeting. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
[71] Skidmore, Thomas (2004). \Brazil's Persistent Income Inequality: Lessons From History." Latin
American Politics and Society, 46(2): p. 133-150.
[72] Souza, Celina (1997). \Constitutional Engineering in Brazil: The Politics of Federalism and
Decentralization." Houndmills and London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press.
[73] Souza, Celina (2001). \Participatory Budgeting in Brazilian Cities: Limits and Possibilities in
Building Democratic Institutions." Environment and Urbanization, 13(1): p. 159-184.
[74] Souza, Celina (2002). \Brazil: the Prospects of a Center-Constraining Federation in a Fragmented
Polity." Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 32(2): p. 23-48.
[75] Souza, Celina (2005). \Brazil's Tax System: The Dilemmas of Policy Reform." FOCAL Policy
Paper 05-02.
[76] Souza, Paulo Renato (2005). A Revolu c~ ao Gerenciada: Educa c~ ao no Brasil 1995-2002. Prentice
Hall: S~ ao Paulo.
[77] Stiglitz, Joseph (1974). \The Demand for Education in Public and Private School Systems."
Journal of Public Economics, 3(4): p. 349-385.
[78] United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Edu-
cation for All (2006). \Strong Foundations: Early Childhood Care and Education." EFA Global
Monitoring Report. UNESCO Publishing: Paris.
[79] United Nations Educational, Scientic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2007).
\Policy Review Report: Early Childhood Care and Education in Brazil." UNESCO Education
Sector, Early Childhood and Family Policy Series No. 13-2007.
[80] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2010). \Head Start Impact Study Final
Report."
[81] Varshney, Ashutosh (1995). Democracy, Development, and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Strug-
gles in India. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[82] Wampler, Brian (2007). Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation and Ac-
countability. Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania.
64